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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, scientific and policy circles throughout Europe have been debat-
ing about how to best create working landscapes that balance agricultural production and
environmental conservation in an economically sustainable fashion. In this regard, multi-
functional landscape strategies have been perceived as a powerful instrument to help the
European Union achieve its sustainable development goals. In an attempt to put these ideas
in place, past reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and more recently the
CAP post-2013 reform, contain a set of environmental standards and objectives that aim to
improve overall environmental sustainability of European farms. This study examines the
current CAP environmental standards both from conservationist and rural development per-
spectives, seeking to identify whether such measures can most successfully foster the concept
of multi-functionality. Through an analysis of the legislative history of the CAP reform pro-
cess, as well as a review of the literature on the conceptual frameworks to multifunctional
agriculture, and particularly exploring the role of institutions in driving environmentally
sustainable farming systems across the EU, the research findings suggest that environmental
objectives have only been partially integrated into the CAP, either because of their limited
scope or their unsuccessful implementation. At the policy level, these findings question the
effectiveness of EU policy efforts to use CAP subsidies as an instrument to deliver environ-
mental goals and contribute to the multiple functions of agriculture. CAP environmental
objectives have to a considerable degree remained fragmented, which reinforces the need
to promote more integrative policy approaches as a way to explore the potentials of multi-
functional agriculture in all its complexity, and to achieve broader sustainability and rural
development goals.
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Chapter 1
CONTEXTUALIZING THE
CHALLENGES FACING
AGRICULTURE
“Agriculture is the dilemma of civilization because it both separates us from nature
and connects us to it; it both makes civilization possible and puts it at risk [...]
Agriculture has not only made civilization and ourselves, it has made and remade
the surface of the entire globe. To ponder the usefulness, beauty, and health of
even a tiny section of that globe, we must ponder agriculture deeply and at length.”
(Jane Smiley)
The expansion of agriculture has been widely recognized as one of the most significant
human alterations to the global environment. Over the past 300 years, total cropland has
increased 466 percent (Goldewijk, 2001), making agriculture the world’s main land-use.
More than one third of the planet’s total available land is currently used for agriculture
(Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). The expansion of extensive farming practices across
space and time has helped create and maintain a variety of valuable semi-natural habitats
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and agricultural landscapes, areas that host a wide range of plant and animal species, and
support a socially diverse rural community. A more recent cite, however, suggest that the
intensification of farming management and the increase in average farm size have threatened
the environment and interfered in important ecosystem functions and services (Richards,
1990).
While acknowledging these dynamics, this study will look into the role of government
policies on shaping agricultural production and development in a way that addresses en-
vironmental and socioeconomic sustainability concerns. More specifically, this thesis looks
into past and current policy efforts in the EU to revert the trend of environmental degrada-
tion driven by the process of agricultural intensification supported by subsidies provided to
farmers over the past decades.
Over the past 50 years, global gross agricultural output has more than tripled in volume,
outstripping the pace of human population growth, while the amount of land devoted to
arable farming globally has increased by only 9 percent (Tilman, 1999; Matson et al., 1997;
and Godfray et al., 2010). This has been accomplished through large investments in agri-
cultural productivity, particularly through the use of high-yielding crop varieties, chemical
fertilizers and pesticides, irrigation, and mechanization (Matson et al., 1997). The massive
public financing of agricultural modernization through subsidies, and the unprecedented em-
ployment of research and technology on a large-scale have significantly contributed to this
process. Besides reducing the demand for new land as a factor of production, agricultural
intensification has also enabled food to become more abundant and cheaper, thereby im-
proving access of the world’s population to affordable food prices and stable markets, and
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contributing to global food security (OECD/FAO, 2012).
At the same time, intensification of arable farming has exacerbated the status of envi-
ronmental degradation of the world’s most valuable ecosystems. Numerous scientific studies
and environmental assessments exploring these impacts across scales have revealed alarming
findings. These include increased levels of soil erosion and lower soil fertility (Whitbread
et al., 1998; and Stoate et al., 2001), biodiversity loss (Butler et al., 2010; Donald et al.,
2001, Robinson & Sutherland, 2002), ground water pollution and eutrophication of rivers
and lakes (Grizzetti et al., 2007; Csatho´ et al., 2007; and EEA, 2010a), and copious amounts
of greenhouse gas emissions and impacts on climate (Schulze et al., 2009; and Ciais et al.,
2010). This unprecedented level of environmental crisis has led scientists, policymakers, and
civil society to raise concerns over the long-term sustainability of intensive agricultural sys-
tems, and triggered public and private debates over the need to reduce the environmental
footprint of agriculture, while maintaining adequate nutrition.
With global human population projected to surpass 9 billion by 2050, and per capita
caloric intake expected to increase by nearly one-third in emerging economies, demand for
agricultural products is estimated to go up 60 percent in the next four decades from its
2005-2007 levels (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). At the same time, nearly 1 billion people
continue without access to sufficient protein and energy from their diet, and even more suffer
from some form of micronutrient malnourishment (Godfray et al., 2010; and OECD/FAO,
2012). Furthermore, the world’s capacity to produce food and other agricultural products
is expected to suffer from the potential effects of anthropogenic climate change, including
impacts on crop yields (Olesen & Bindi, 2002), more extreme and unpredictable weather
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events, and shifts in land suitability (Zabel et al, 2014). Irrigated agriculture also may
face constraints on the availability of water as it accounts for nearly 70 percent of all water
withdrawals globally (OECD/FAO, 2012).
When designing future policies that address how to meet the rising demand for agricul-
tural output and the global food security puzzle, policy-makers will have to face fundamental
challenges as agriculture will be constrained as never before by the Earth’s finite resources.
This will require efforts beyond the business-as-usual increase in agricultural productivity
as other environmental shortfalls in the food and farming systems still need to be closed
(Godfray et al., 2010). Investments in agricultural research and development are key to
develop cost-effective solutions that also halt environmental degradation and restore fragile
ecosystems. Policies that provide economic incentives for producers, strengthen rural edu-
cation and agricultural extension services, and improve rural infrastructure and access to
markets also are urgent.1 Policy solutions from a consumer perspective will have to include
efforts to reduce global food waste both in developed and developing nations, as roughly
30 to 40 percent of all food produced globally is lost to waste (Godfray, 2010). Public and
private efforts may consider the need to educate society about the environmental and health
implications of animal-protein-based diets; obesity and over-nutrition is an epidemic that
currently affects more than 1.5 billion people around the world, and has become the number
one cause of death in the US (OECD/FAO, 2012; and US DHHS, 2012). Worldwide, obesity
levels have nearly doubled over the past 30 years, particularly among the poor, exposing
1Especially in developing countries, where reliance in food imports are predicted to sharply increase in
the following years (OECD/FAO, 2012; World Bank; and USDA).
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the world to the double burden of malnutrition and obesity.2 Efforts to encourage shifts in
diets and reduce global consumption of animal products may offer an opportunity to feed
more people with less land and provide other environmental and health benefits (Pray et al.,
2014).3
These are unprecedented challenges facing humankind, the environment, and agriculture
that are presented here to put into perspective the linkages between agriculture and the
environment’s limited capacity to fulfill modern societies needs, aspirations and well-being.
Today, these linkages are better understood - although not yet fully explored and assimilated
- and have been the object of on-going research and policy debates (Clark, 2002). The world
is witnessing a moment of transition, where governments, private entities, civil society and
other stakeholders must combine efforts at the energy, environment and agriculture nexus
to address these complex environmental and societal challenges.
Consensus is growing that meeting the food, feed, fiber, energy and industrial needs
of an overpopulated world while reducing the environmental footprint of agriculture must
be accomplished sustainably, primarily by utilizing existing (or even less) land and natural
resources to increase production (IPCC, 2014 and OECD/FAO, 2012). One way to accom-
plish this would be through the sustainable intensification4 of agriculture. Using agricultural
2The links between food insecurity and obesity is one that researchers have explored over the past decade,
trying to understand their relationships to poverty and to other potential drivers. For more details see
Godfray et al., 2010.
3About one-third of global cereal production is fed to animals. Therefore, reducing the consumption of
meat, will lead to a reduction on the demand for feedstock, freeing up land that could be used to produce
food to feed humans and source the world’s increasing demand for bioenergy and biomaterials. Furthermore,
according to the World Health Organization (WHO), well-balanced diets rich in grains and other vegetable
products are considered to be healthier than those containing a high proportion of meat (especially red meat)
and dairy products.
4The term sustainable intensification was initially used in the mid-1990s in the context of developing food
production in Africa. It was also one of the five core themes used by the European Union Agriculture, Food
Security and Climate Change Joint Program Initiative (FACCE JPI): “Environmentally sustainable growth
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subsidies to promote best management practices has also been seen as a powerful strategy.
Concerns over the sustainability, renewability, greenness, fairness, environmental feasi-
bility of sourcing materials have become central to many governments, civil society and
businesses (Backstrand, 2006; Van Dam et al, 2008; UN, 2014; and Pattberg, 2012 ).5 One
sector under particular scrutiny has been the biofuels sector where producers have been re-
quired to observe sustainability standards as a pre-condition to access some markets.6. Also,
in the food and forestry industries,7 groups have set voluntary targets for sustainable sourc-
ing as a response to market/consumers demand (Endres, 2011). Defining what it means to
be sustainable from an environmental, social and economic perspectives, however, requires
further refining in policy, research and practice.
The Brundtland Report (1987) is recognized as the first attempt to formally define sus-
and intensification of agriculture” (Franks, 2014). Generally, sustainable intensification can be achieved
through land sharing and land sparing approaches. There is an on-going debate about which one of these
strategies produce the best of agriculture and ecosystem services. While in land sparing homogeneous areas
of farmland are managed to maximize yields offsetting separate reserves to target biodiversity conservation,
land sharing, by contrast, integrates conservation and production within more heterogeneous landscapes.
Different scientific world views underpin the two approaches, and have shown unique advantages and dis-
advantages. Finding the appropriate balance between these two strategies, however, may present some
challenges, and should take into account site-specific aspects such as natural constraints, institutional and
governance arrangements, socio-economic dynamics, and historical land-use patterns (Franks, 2014).
5Private companies are taking the lead by transforming their business models for sustainable development.
But there is plenty of space to be explore and further efforts to be made, as the world has only scratched
the surface of the potential for ethics-driven investment by the private sector. With the right incentives,
policies, regulations and monitoring in place, great opportunities may emerge. In the bioenergy and forestry
sector, discussions on sustainability have been refined over the years and gained space in public policies
and legislation. For instance, bioenergy policies such as the EU Renewable Energy Directive (Directive
2009/28/EC) and the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) have contained requirements to address
sustainability concerns. Also, in China, India and South Africa, laws and policies provide clear clauses
to avoid biofuels pathways that directly affect food security (Gasparatos et al., 2013). Private standards
and certification regimes have emerged to address consumers concerns over the sustainability of various
products. These include, for example, the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB), the Sustainable
Forestry Initiative (SFI), the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the International Sustainability and Carbon
Certification (ISCC), and Bonsucro.
6Requirements set by government mandates, such as the EU Renewable Energy Directive and the Cali-
fornia Low Carbon Fuel Standards.)
7For example, Unilever, Coca-Cola, Walmart, Roundtable for Responsible Soy, Sustainable Forestry Ini-
tiative.
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tainable development as that which “meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. In the biofuels sector, bioenergy
laws and several voluntary standard initiatives have designed ways to address the envi-
ronmental and socioeconomic aspects of increased biofuels production. These public and
private standards usually contain principles governing air quality, water and soil quality and
quantity, GHG emissions, biodiversity, land conversion, and socioeconomic considerations
(Endres, 2011).8 Some scholars have also developed a list of recommended indicators to
assess socioeconomic aspects of sustainability of biofuels beyond job creation (Dale et al.,
2013).
Lessons learned from biofuels sustainability efforts can inform and support the devel-
opment of sustainability science and practice in agriculture in general. Perhaps one of the
biggest challenges moving forward will be to ensure that standards implementation and ver-
ification relies on the use of scientifically-verifiable and objective measurements. This will
require detailed farm-level information, efforts to foster the exchange and publicity of large
datasets for scientifically-sound analyses, and addressing questions about public disclosure of
confidential business information that might emerge in legal disputes. If the ultimate goal of
sustainability is to ensure continuous improvement of environmental and social conditions,
information and lessons learned in standards implementation must be channeled back into
adaptive management to ensure that outcomes match sustainability aspirations (Endres et
al., 2015).
8Such standards allow for a comparative process to determine whether one set of actions may be better
than another based on criteria set by society through a transparent political process following principles of
good governance. For more detail see Endres et al. (2015).
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More than ever, non-state actors such as business, non-governmental organizations (NGO),
and civil society have become increasingly important and influential actors in both public
and private regulatory processes (Fuchs, 2003; McAllister, 2012; Endres, 2012). A mul-
tifaceted environmental governance system where multiple stakeholders interact and share
responsibilities has replaced the top-down, government-centric regulatory system9. In this
new system, governments play a facilitatory role in providing the institutional framework
for decision-making through the structuring of incentives and baseline regulatory constraints
(Fuchs, 2003).
In the European Union, the institutional framework for agri-environmental standards has
been set by both general environmental directives and agri-environmental standards tied to
agricultural subsidies. In order to justify government intervention and address agriculture’s
environmental problems, agri-environment standards have been progressively integrated into
the CAP. Well-known for taking a precautionary stance toward environmental, food quality
and animal welfare issues, the EU is often recognized as a leading actor in international
environmental policy. Acting as a normative power (Manners, 2002), the EU has helped
shape international negotiations and influenced other countries’ approaches to environmental
and climate change agreements. Therefore, understanding the ways in which EU institutions
have supported environmental decision-making in agriculture and fostered the sustainability
debate comes hand in hand with a global questioning of our current economic model and
the challenges of establishing a sustainable global economy.
Despite recent efforts to green the CAP, the first three decades of CAP intervention
9where state actors were vested with the exclusive authority to set the standards, impose sanctions and
establish stringent criteria of acceptable behavior
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mechanisms completely neglected agriculture’s environmental externalities and set the pace
of agricultural modernization across EU farmland. Implemented in a period of great eco-
nomic instability, CAP market intervention mechanisms were seen as a way to increase
agricultural productivity, ensure a fair standard of living for farmers, assure availability of
food supplies and ensure reasonable food prices for consumers (Article 39 of the TFEU;
and Zobbe, 2001). In the 1960s, agriculture employed some 25 percent of the EU-6 work-
force, and in some countries (e.g. Italy) 40 percent of the population benefited from CAP
funding (Staab, 2011, 116). Every product was guaranteed a price higher than the world-
market price, giving farmers all the incentives to produce more (Staab, 2011, 117). Because
guaranteed prices bear no relation to demand, CAP price support schemes stimulated in-
tensification of farming, leading to overproduction and significant environmental and social
impacts (Stoate et al., 2001).
For many years, the CAP was the only common European community policy governed
at the EU level, and served as an important instrument of EU integration (Staab, 2011).
However, as other policy agendas (e.g. foreign policy and finance) started to draw increas-
ing attention, the CAP lost its centrality in EU policy-making, presenting even increasing
pressure against large yearly budgets. This process coincides with a significant downturn of
the economic preeminence of the agricultural sector, which employs today only 5 percent of
the EU-27 workforce and contributes to only 1.2 percent of its total gross domestic product
(EP, 2013; and Barthelemy & Vidal, 1999).
Despite this, the CAP continues to be at the core of the EU financial negotiations as
the Union’s single largest item of expenditure. Some 38 percent of the recently agreed upon
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EU Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) has been allocated to support CAP direct
payments and rural development programs.10 These changing political, socio-economic and
environmental contexts in which CAP negotiations are embedded have triggered discussions
about how to best use agricultural subsidies to address the current challenges faced by agri-
culture. Over the past decades, political reforms to the CAP framework have attempted
to raise the prominence of environmental protection in EU agriculture and ensure farmers
are compensated for the public goods and services they provide. Underpinning these policy
measures is the multifunctionality paradigm, which holds that agriculture should be valued
not only in terms of the food it supplies, but also in terms of its contribution to the main-
tenance of a rural population, and the preservation of the countryside, its traditions, social,
cultural and natural values.
The concept of multifunctional agriculture has emerged as a key notion in scientific and
policy debates on the future of agriculture and rural development. In the literature, multi-
functionality has been conceptualized following four main categories of research approaches
(Renting et al., 2009). The first follows a market-regulation approach, which gives particular
attention to the economic aspects of multifunctionality and to governance mechanisms for
structuring markets for the non-commodity outputs of agriculture (OECD, 2001 and 2003).
The second consists of the land-use approach, which addresses spatial aspects and the
territorial level as important elements for the design of multifunctional landscapes.11 Mod-
10Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 884)
based on the political agreement reached in June 2013 by Parliament, the Council and the Commission (vote
in Parliament on 20 November 2013 - resolution P7 TA(2013)455).
11Land-use approaches to multifunctionality originate mostly from the natural sciences disciplines such
as landscape and conservation ecology, production ecology, geography, and land-use planning. Its strength
lies in adding a spacial dimension to analysis of multifunctionality. However, similar to other approaches,
land-use approaches to multifunctionality have a number of limitations. These limitations mostly concern
10
eling plays a big role here, but is usually applied at the aggregated level (Groot et al., 2009;
and Lovell & Johnston, 2009).
Third is the actor-oriented approach, giving central attention to multifunctional agricul-
tural issues at the farm level and, in particular, to decision-making processes of actors in the
social construction of multifunctional agricultural practices (Harden et al., 2014; and Dale
& Kline, 2014).
Finally, the public-regulation approach gives central attention to institutional and policy
aspects of multifunctional agriculture, departing from the prominent role of public insti-
tutions in structuring and regulating the management of public goods to achieve desired
outcomes (Potter & Tilzey, 2005; Laurent et al. 2006; Renting et al, 2009; Potter, 2004;
Abler, 2004; and Abramovay, 2002).
Drawing from all of these approaches, this thesis investigates the extent to which CAP
institutional arrangements have fostered the concept of multifunctionality and supported
European farmers on their task to reconcile agricultural production and environmental con-
servation.
Driven both by neoliberal commitments set under WTO agreements on agriculture, and
seeking to promote and compensate environmental public goods provided by agriculture,12
the multifunctionality paradigm has been seen as a way to move the CAP more toward the
principle of “public money for public goods” (Matthews, 2013b). As part of this process,
the difficulties: (i) in addressing synergies resulting from combinations of multiple functions at farm level,
amongst farmers or between agriculture and other land-uses; (ii) the limited role social processes underlying
land management practices play in the analysis; (iii) and the fact these analysis only focus on multifunctional
land-use rather than on multifunctional agriculture.
12These include landscape and open-space amenities, cultural heritage, rural economic viability, domestic
food security, prevention of natural hazards, groundwater resource recharge, preservation of biodiversity,
greenhouse gas sinks, etc.
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reforms have been implemented to fully decouple CAP payments from production levels13,
and re-balance CAP expenditures through modulation.14
These reforms have been established following an layered process, based on the building
of specific policy instruments on top of others to address issues as diverse as food production,
world trade, sustainability, rural development, renewable energy and climate change. On the
extreme side of the policy debate are farmers unions and environmental organizations, who
have become influential actors shaping negotiations (Medina & Potter, 2014). While farmers
have embraced the concept of sustainable intensification as a way to reconcile production and
conservation, environmental groups have stressed the multifunctionality paradigm to push for
further integration of ecosystem services protection within CAP supporting schemes (Medina
& Potter, 2015). Even though both groups agree agriculture should continue to rely on public
financing, there is a fundamental divergence on the way they believe the budget should be
spent (Medina & Potter, 2015). On one hand, farmers seek the CAP income supporting
system to be maintained with minimum environmental obligations. Environmental groups,
on the other hand, believe subsidies should be strategically used to promote environmental
protection through standards and targeted agri-environment schemes (Boatman et al., 2008;
Broughton et al., 2014; Garibaldi et al., 2013; and Pywell et al., 2012). This historical
process of multi-layered accommodation of competing approaches into the CAP has created
inherent tensions and made negotiations much more susceptible to outside pressure.
The CAP greening process began in 1992, when the MacSharry reform introduced for the
13Shifting subsidies away from a price support system to implement farmers’ income support payments.
14The term modulation refers to the the process of progressively transferring money from Pillar 1 (direct
payments) to Pillar 2 (Rural Development Agenda).
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first time the “protection of the environment and the development of the natural potential
of the countryside” as one of its main objectives (Grossman, 1994). Every time a new CAP
agreement is up for negotiation, EU institutions have an opportunity to decide where to
set the environmental baseline in European agriculture. The last round of negotiations was
initiated by the Commission’s greening strategy which promised to raise the environmental
bar of cross-compliance and proposed additional greening measures to be tied to 30 percent
of direct payments. The final rule agreed in 2013 substantially watered down several aspects
of the Commission’s proposal, and is perceived as a missed opportunity to pursue further
greening in both pillars of the CAP (Matthews, 2013b).
This study explores the process by which environmental objectives have been integrated
into the CAP, and whether agri-environment measures implemented through CAP trans-
fers have successfully fostered the concept of multifunctional agriculture. Combining the
four major approaches to multifunctionality this research investigates the efficacy of EU
institutions in supporting farmers in transitioning to a more environmentally, socially and
economically sustainable agricultural model. Particular focus is placed on regulation at the
nexus of environmental, agricultural and energy policy.
In order to answer this research question, this thesis is divided into five main chapters.
In addition to this introduction and the following section describing the methods, chapter 3
presents a brief summary of recent studies exploring environmental externalities in European
agriculture and situates the reader in terms of the relevance of the sustainability issues
explored in this study. The following chapter 4 is devoted to the exploration of the role of
public policies in promoting agricultural multi-functionality, and investigates whether and
13
how institutions have supported European farmers in their challenging task to reconcile
increasing global demand for agricultural output with conservation goals set under the EU
2020 sustainable development strategy. Chapter 5, then identifies past and present policy
efforts to green the EU Common Agricultural Policy, with an emphasis on the recent CAP
reform negotiations. The UK is used as a case-study to identify challenges and opportunities
in implementation. Chapter 5 ends with recommendations for future policies, highlighting
the need for more integrative policy approaches that can fully explore CAP subsidies in order
to deliver the potentials of multifunctional agriculture in all its complexity, and as a way
toward sustainable rural development. Final conclusions are then summarized in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
METHODOLOGY
In order to answer the research questions this work uses the following methods. First, a
review of the literature on the conceptual frameworks to multifunctional agriculture is pro-
vided to identify the different approaches used in various scientific fields, and explore how
these notions have been translated into recent reforms of the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). In particular, this study draws from the public-regulation literature on multi-
functionality to investigate the role of the EU institutions and Member States in promoting
the provision of public goods and services in agriculture.
Second, it analyzes the CAP greening process by reviewing its legislative history to
identify how past reforms have addressed major environmental and social problems arising
from unsustainable farming practices. In addition, it examines how the implementation of
CAP environmental objectives has fostered the concept of multi-functionality, both from
an environmental and rural development perspective. Specifically, it focuses on the last five
CAP reforms as they have introduced some level of environmental protection into agricultural
subsidies. These are the 1992 (MacSharry reform), the Agenda 2000, the 2003 Mid-term
reform, the 2008 Health Check, and the most recent Post-2013 reform. A detailed analysis of
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the implementation process at the Member State level is presented using the United Kingdom
as a case study. Other references are made to other Member States where appropriate.
Lastly, lessons learned from interactions with experts and relevant stakeholders in the
fields of agri-environment law and policies and bioenergy certification have helped confirm
some research findings. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in field level analysis both
in the UK (East Anglia University and Imperial College London) and in the Netherlands
(Wageningen University).15 Experts from these well-known institutions with substantial
knowledge on these subjects have provided valuable materials, and significantly contributed
to the development of this thesis, especially by sharing their understanding of how multi-
functionality has helped shape CAP negotiations over the years. Furthermore, their collab-
orations were also helpful in terms of situating EU agricultural policies in relation to other
sectorial policies, particularly bioenergy.
15Field research was supported by the 2013/2014 European Union Center of Excellence Graduate Student
Travel Grant, via an European Union grant to the University of Illinois.
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Chapter 3
AGRICULTURAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
EXTERNALITIES IN EUROPE
“One of the basic assumptions of the new agriculture is that humans can and
should manipulate nature at its very foundations for the sake of feeding as many
humans as possible.” (Jane Smiley, 1997)
Since the establishment of the first agricultural societies in Europe in the mid-Holocene,
humans have substantially altered the European landscape (Kaplan et al., 2009). The clear-
ance of forests and woodlands to open up areas for agricultural development, and to source
energy and increasing demand for construction materials has been one of the most evident
and influential drivers of anthropogenic land use changes (LUC). The effects of these changes
on global climate are currently the subject of a lively debate (Kaplan et al., 2010).
Although the process of human interference in the global environment has exacerbated
particularly over the past 300 years (Goldewijk, 2001), research suggests that some European
regions also may have experienced successive cycles of deforestation, abandonment, and
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afforestation throughout the centuries preceding the Industrial Revolution (Kaplan et al,
2009). This process of long and continuing human alteration of our global environment
has had important implications for local, regional, and global ecosystems dynamics, and
contains lessons for understanding what constitutes environmental sustainability, and the
kind of policy solutions that may be required moving forward.
Over the last hundred years, and particularly since the mid-1900s, drivers of agricultural
development16 have led to widespread agricultural improvements and the intensification of
land management practices across all EU Member States.17 The process of agricultural
intensification consists of an increased application of chemical inputs such as fertilizers and
pesticides, increasing scale and mechanization of farming operations, and simplification of
agricultural systems. Since 1945, the number of farms has declined 65 percent, and farm
labor dropped 77 percent, while yield increased almost fourfold across the EU (Robinson &
Sutherland, 2002). Although small-scale, extensive mixed farming systems still survive in
many parts of the European countryside, particularly in the South and Central-East, they
have suffered increasing pressure from market-oriented policies to become more intensified.
Today, agriculture accounts for the largest share of land use in Europe, with nearly 50
percent of the EU’s total land currently farmed. As the major land-use system, agriculture
greatly influences the design and conservation status of arable and non-arable landscapes
across the whole EU. Particularly, recent intensification has severely threatened the quality
16Such as rising prices and commoditization of food markets, technological advances and market measures
supported under the EU Common Agricultural Policy.
17Although intensive and large scale agriculture is a feature commonly associated to Western European
Member States, since 1990s rapid moves toward both intensification and abandonment have started to take
place also in Eastern Europe, with EU integration efforts greatly influencing the rate of this change (Stoate
et al., 2001).
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of natural and arable landscapes across Europe.
Because unsustainable agricultural practices have implications that go beyond the farm-
gate, society as a whole has borne the environmental and social costs of intensification (Stoate
et al., 2001). An extensive body of research has provided evidence on the environmental and
social sustainability concerns of modern agriculture. These scientific contributions have
fueled policy debates and public opinion on the environmental externalities of agriculture.
Among these externalities are habitat and biodiversity loss, soil degradation, and water and
air pollution.
A combination of abandonment of agricultural production and land intensification has
been identified as the main drivers of declines in the area of natural and semi-natural habitats
across the whole EU. Around 47 percent of all European agricultural sites suffer from land
abandonment, whereas intensification is a major threat to 43 percent of them (EEA, 2009).
Extensive farmland abandonment is a phenomenon driven by a complex range of factors
that undermine the viability of farming under certain land use and socio-economic contexts
(Keenleyside & Tucker, 2010). Among the main drivers of land abandonment are ecolog-
ical elements (e.g. constraints to productivity and mechanization posed by geographical
factors such as steep slopes or low soil fertility), socio-economic conditions (e.g. declining
meat prices, labor and time constraints, poor access to markets, aging and decreasing rural
populations due to increased urbanization), and land mismanagement factors (soil erosion)
factors (IEEP & Veenecology, 2004; and Keenleyside & Tucker, 2010). The abandonment
of agricultural land represents a change of land use, a complex phenomenon that can bring
about both positive and negative consequences. Among the potential impacts of land aban-
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donment identified by Benayas et al. (2007) are: reduction of landscape heterogeneity,
often associated with increased fire frequency, soil erosion and desertification, reduction of
water stocks, biodiversity loss, and loss of cultural and aesthetic values. Abandoned land,
particularly in marginal areas with reduced environmental value, is unlikely to recover to
historical vegetation status through natural succession, and may require active restoration
if the system is to sustain diverse animal and plant species, and provide ecosystem services
when management intervention is lost. Active restoration of these areas, however, may pose
significant scientific and policy challenges.
On the other hand, replacement of extensive farming with more intensified systems has
threatened key European farmland habitats and species of community interest, with conse-
quent disruption to food chains and declines in many farmland species (IEEP & Veenecology,
2004; Keenleyside & Tucker, 2010; Pola´kova´ et al, 2011; and Zimmermann et al, 2010). Four
main types of habitats have been particularly impacted, among them grasslands, woodlands,
several types of wetlands and peatlands, and small farmland habitats and landscape features
(e.g. meadows, hedgerows, stone walls) (Robinson & Sutherland, 2002; Wilson 1992).
Sharp declines in farmland bird populations (a good indicator for wider biodiversity
health) have also been observed across Europe, representing a severe threat to biological
diversity (Donald et al., 2001; Robinson & Sutherland, 2002).18 Besides threatening plant
and animal communities (Donald et al., 2001; Meeus, 1993; and Robinson & Sutherland,
2002), farming intensification has also been associated to impacts on soils (Manlay et al.,
18Donald et al. (2001) show that 30 percent of the variance in farmland bird declines across EU countries
can be solely explained by changes in cereal yield, as a result of more intensive crop- and livestock-husbandry
practices.
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2007; and Baldock & Mitchell, 1995), air pollution (Schulze et al., 2009), surface and ground
water depletion (Burt at al. 2010), and created highly modified and less-diverse agricultural
landscapes.
Decline in soil quality also has been attributed to intensification of agriculture incen-
tivized by market measures established under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). With
little incentives to implement soil conservation measures, European farmers have contributed
to the deterioration of soils as a result of erosion, compaction, loss of organic matter, and
contamination with pesticides19 and heavy metals (Baldock & Mitchell, 1995; Boardman et
al., 1990; and Ingram & Morris, 2007). During the last 40 years, nearly 1/3 of the world’s
arable land has been lost to erosion and continues to be lost at a rate of more than 22 million
acres per year (Pimentel et al., 1995). In the EU, more than 15 percent of its territory is
currently affected by a significant level of soil erosion, which has led to a e3.5 billion loss in
agricultural production (Louwagie et al., 2009).
Impacts on soil have been closely related to those on water, as nutrient and pesticide
pollution of water results from surface runoff and subsurface flow of chemical inputs (In-
gram & Morris, 2007). Despite improvements in some regions, diffuse water pollution from
agriculture remains a major environmental problem in many parts of Europe. Today, non-
point source pollution affects more than 40 percent of rivers and coastal water bodies in the
continent (EEA, 2015; and EEA, 2007). In particular, nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus)
from agricultural fertilizers and pesticides, and pollution from manure are regularly detected
in aquatic environments at excessive levels, causing eutrophication, resulting in changes in
19While pesticides protect crops from damage caused by weeds, diseases and insects, they can harm people,
wildlife and the environment.
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species abundance and diversity, as well as algal blooms, deoxygenated dead zones, and
leaching of nitrate to groundwater.20 All of these changes threaten the long-term quality
of aquatic environments, and have implications for the provision of ecosystem services such
as drinking water, fisheries, recreation opportunities, and agriculture. Achieving improved
water quality requires meeting certain standards for the ecology, chemistry, morphology and
quantity of waters (CEC, 2012). Therefore, water quality and quantity are directly linked.
Besides being the main source of nutrient pollution, agriculture is also a major source of
water withdrawal. It accounts for over 44 percent of total water use in Europe. Irrigation of
crops constitutes the major water use in agriculture, especially in southern Member States
where many crops rely on irrigation technology, and over-abstraction remains an issue. Man-
aging water use in agriculture has, thus, become one of the key themes relating to water
scarcity and drought in the EU.
Intensification of arable farming also has been associated with air pollution, namely
greenhouse gases (GHG) such as methane (CH) from animal manure, nitrogen dioxide
(NO) from chemical inputs, and carbon dioxide (CO). Currently, agriculture responds for
about 9 percent of total EU GHG emissions (down from 11 percent in 1995; see Freibauer,
2003). Methane (CH) contributes to 49 percent of all GHG emissions in agriculture, and
75 percent of it comes from the livestock sector (BirdLife, 2012). Carbon emissions from
transport and fertilizer application for land management have also contributed to total emis-
20Traditionally, soil fertilization practices in Europe used to rely mainly on low-cost biological fixation of
nitrogen and the relatively high nutrient capital of the soils. Up until the second half of the 20th century,
mineral fertilizers did not account for more than 15 percent of nutrients utilized by crops, and even in 1940,
in the economic context of recession and World Wars, they played only a limited contribution to the second
agricultural revolution. For more information see Manlay et al. (2007).
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sions (Schulze et al., 2009).21 Moreover, the loss of soil organic matter has also reduced the
system’s capacity to sequester carbon.
Agriculture may also face unprecedented challenges posed by climate change, including
shifts in land suitability, reduced crop-yields, and water shortages. Recent estimates suggest
that total cropland is likely to shrink by 1.7 million square kilometers across all regions of
the EU (including protected areas and dense forest) (Zabel et al., 2014). Although warmer
and wetter conditions are expected to make some previously uncultivable areas suitable
for agriculture (e.g. in the Scandinavian Member States),22 overall, total suitable land is
expected to decline in the continent. The area that may face the greatest loss of suitability
is the Mediterranean region, one of the most important for European agriculture, where total
suitable land is expected to decline by 0.7 million square kilometers.
Although agriculture is not the only land-use system damaging the environment, it is
clearly the one that will most suffer the consequences of climate change and environmental
disturbances, as it directly relies on the ecological functions provided by natural ecosystems.
Because agriculture cannot be sustained in isolation from its surrounding environment, it
must be planned and managed in a way that minimizes its social and environmental impacts
(Jongman, 2002). From this perspective, efforts to reconcile environmental conservation and
the sustainable intensification of agriculture have become central to European agricultural
policies.
Increasing attention has been given in policy and research to understand and mitigate
21These are low estimates because they do not include the production costs of pesticides, the heating cost
of greenhouses, cooling of storage rooms and other indirect energy needs.
22According to the same study, 0.21 million square kilometers of land could become available for agricul-
tural production in this region.
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environmental impacts in agriculture and improve resource-use efficiency. Addressing these
issues requires redirecting public subsidies toward encouraging the positive externalities of
agriculture that have been under-provided in the market place, combined with a mix of
advisory and institutional mechanisms, regulatory and legal measures, and economic instru-
ments to correct negative externalities. Public and private investments in technology and
innovation, and the establishment of partnerships among multi-stakeholders are crucial to
facilitating this process.
In today’s plural environmental governance regimes, governments play a key role in set-
ting the institutional frameworks to promote the sustainability of resource use by state and
non-state actors through the structuring of incentives and constraints (Fuchs, 2003).
In order to situate the reader in the debate, the following chapter will discuss some the-
oretical basis for the role of institutions in shaping private rights to protect public goods.
Chapter 4 will also present a theoretical framework to the concept of multifunctional agri-
culture which will illuminate further discussions on the use of agricultural subsidies to com-
pensate the non-commodity outputs of agriculture (e.g. environmental and social goods), a
discussion that has become increasingly influential in the implementation of CAP environ-
mental measures.
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Chapter 4
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICIES
IN PROMOTING AGRICULTURAL
MULTI-FUNCTIONALITY
4.1 THEORETICAL APPROACH TO ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY-MAKING
A wide range of factors have been identified by political scientists as determinants of
environmental quality. These include institutional, economic, and social factors that in one
way or the other drive human societies’ interaction with theirs surrounding environment.
Understanding the role of institutions in promoting environmental quality is of particular
interest to this work, as institutional capacity and structure can play a fundamental role in
shaping public and private actors’ behavior toward improved environmental conditions. One
specific institutional factor driving environmental governance is the structure and quality
of property rights. In combination with social norms, technology, and resource conditions,
property rights can greatly determine collective outcomes in social settings (Young, 1994).
Thus, the definition and enforcement of property rights provide a foundation for environ-
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mental and economic activity, particularly relevant in an increasingly complex world where
interactions among multiple actors take place across space and time.
Understanding how different arrangements of property rights can affect environmental
quality and governance has been the goal of an extensive array of literature. One important
contribution to this debate has been given by the collective action theory (Taylor, 1987).
According to this theory, rational and independent individuals tend to base their withdrawal
and investment decisions on expectations of return (cost-benefit analysis). Thus, when co-
operation is required for the provision of some socially desirable good, such as environmental
quality, individuals’ strategies to maximize their utility prevent them from contributing to
the common goal. Collective action problems particularly arise from situations in which indi-
vidual’ property rights are not well-defined and enforced, as in the case of common property
and open-access resources.23 To put this into perspective, we can use the example of common
fresh-water users who need to invest in water treatment facilities but have low incentives to
do so because they know rival appropriators will capture part of the return on their invest-
ments (Fuchs, 2003). In this sense, collective action problems are essentially characterized
by divergences between social and private costs and benefits, in other words, externalities.
Because a complete or partial lack of property rights is frequent in the context of envi-
ronmental resources, environmental externalities abound, reaching from local problems, such
as the pollution and destruction of fresh water resources and soils, to global problems, such
as climate change and biodiversity loss. In the absence of secure property rights over open-
access natural resources, individuals cannot prevent their overuse by others. Thus, the only
23Given their low level of excludability and the high potential to free-ride for non-contributors.
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way to optimize their private benefits is through increasing their own withdrawal rates above
the social optimum, as gains are distributed on a first-come, first-serve basis (Fuchs, 2003).
This has resulted in over harvested fishing grounds, depleted hunting grounds, destroyed
forests, and severely polluted air and water resources. Environmental externalities can also
arise from a situation where land is held as private property but its use directly or indirectly
interferes in common-property or open-access natural resources. This occurs, for example,
when specific types of land-uses and practices give rise to overexploitation and depletion of
important ecosystems services, for which property rights are not defined or enforced. This
is the case, for example, of trans-boundary resources such as air and waterways.
Hardin’s (1968) theory of the tragedy of the commons was the first to draw attention to
this dynamic, suggesting that the definition and enforcement of property rights determine
one’s attitude toward environmental resources. He argues that in the absence of well-defined
and well-enforced property rights individuals are likely to act according to their self-interest
and contrary to the best interests of the whole group by over-exploiting and depleting some
common natural resources (Fuchs, 2003). This occurs because the environmental costs of an
individual’s action are not only borne by that individual, the same way as the environmental
benefits from an individual’s action do not all accrue to that individual. These factors may
influence and individual’s willingness to preserve or over-explore such resource (Fuchs, 2003).
Though the original economic argument underlying Hardin’s tragedy of the commons is not
without weaknesses. One of the major problems is in the fact that it ignores other variables
that also may lead to collective action outcomes. Particularly, it overlooks the role of legal
provisions and social norms in limiting individuals’ behavior toward the environment. This
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notion will inform future discussions on the role of law and policies in shaping agricultural
multifunctionality in the EU.
Another general assumption underlying market driven environmental-economics studies
is the one that suggests that economic growth is a good determinant for environmental qual-
ity. This relationship has been conventionally represented by an inverted U-shape curve
(environmental Kuznets curve), and has been given credence by some findings which suggest
that, for a number of pollutants, there appears to be an empirical relationship between in-
come per capita and environmental quality. This means that as income per capita increases,
environmental quality deteriorates up to a point beyond which environmental quality im-
proves (World Bank, 1992). Driven by this line of thought, policy reforms designed to
promote trade liberalization have been encouraged with little regard to their environmental
consequences, presumably under the assumption that these consequences would either take
care of themselves or could be dealt with separately.
Refuting this thesis, Dasgupta (1996) makes the case that economic liberalization and
other policies that promote growth in gross national product are not substitutes for environ-
mental policy. On the contrary, it may well be desirable that economic development policies
are accompanied by policy reforms to address market failure in mitigating environmental
externalities. Fuchs (2003) also provides some empirical evidence that, independent of eco-
nomic growth, improvements in institutional capacity can have a positive impact on environ-
mental quality, thus suggesting that governments in both poor and rich nations can equally
improve environmental conditions via straightening institutional capacities.24 Corroborating
24For example, by restricting private rights to reduce environmental externalities.
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this argument is a recent study by Rodrigues et al.(2014) which finds that wealthier nations
protect biodiversity no better than poor nations, thus suggesting that economic development
does not guarantee success in conservation policies. According to this study, countries like
Australia and the United States - two of the richest nations - were found to be among the
worst performers in achieving good status of biodiversity conservation, while poorer nations
including Madagascar and Tanzania are among the best.
Furthermore, when looking for other potential drivers of environmental quality, Dasgupta
et al.(1995) find freedom of property to have a significant impact on individual decisions
affecting environmental conditions. The authors suggest that the connections between en-
vironmental protection and civil and political liberties are a close one, and they are key to
realize collective goals. Thus, the solution to current environmental crises should involve ef-
forts to reform institutional settings to galvanize private users of resources to account for the
social costs of their actions (Dasgupta, 1996). For Dasgupta, more than economic growth,
what matters for environmental quality is the content of economic growth, which is deter-
mined by, among other things, the institutional framework within which human activities
are conducted. In this sense, better institutions not only promote greater efficiency in the
allocation of environmental resources at all income levels, but also assure a sustainable scale
of economic activity within the ecological life-support system. This line of thought may
explain, for instance, why voluntary approaches taken by free-market oriented policies have
failed to solve major environmental problems, as these policies often give self-interested in-
dividuals the freedom to pursue their personal gains without concern for social costs (Fuchs,
2003).
29
With this theoretical framework in mind, we can now turn into the EU to explore how
environmental regulation has been structured there, and the extent to which current institu-
tional settings have been used to address major environmental problems in agriculture. En-
vironmental policy decisions are particularly restricted by constitutional frameworks, which
allow for different degrees of policy intervention and may require different actions by govern-
ments (Hall, 1993). Another challenge governments may face in environmental governance
is in terms of reforming institutions and designing policies that are appropriate for the
objectives to be achieved. This requires understanding complex ecosystem dynamics under-
pinning environmental systems that are so heavily influenced by equally complex property
rights regimes. While science only scratched the surface in terms of exploring these dynam-
ics and testing ecosystems’ resistance to anthropogenic interference - making environmental
policy more challenging - one way some governments, including the EU, and some private
actors have dealt with these uncertainties is through applying a precautionary approach to
environmental decision-making.
4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE EU
In the European Union, environmental regulation is structured under a very unique insti-
tutional framework, which differs from traditional constitutional systems.25 In this system,
25While in sovereign nation-states the division of legal prerogatives between federal and state powers
and the deliberation of values are set under normative-frameworks based on classical constitutions, in the
European Union the governance system is created by law, by treaties. The EU treaties set the division of
legal competences between EU institutions (supranational and intergovernmental) and Member States, and
the deliberation of values in the EU’s legal order. In this system, EU institutions and Member States act by
legal measures and all of their actions, legislative or executive, are subject to judicial review on legal grounds
in national courts and Community courts for ensuring compatibility with the treaties and with other basic
overriding legal principles. For more detail on the EU constitutional framework see Laffan (2001).
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EU institutions and Member States share responsibilities over the protection of the envi-
ronment. The division of power between the Union and sovereign Member States is guided
by the principles of legality,26 subsidiarity27 and proportionality.28 In a nutshell, the aim of
these principles is to restrain the use of powers in EU policy-making.29
Among the arguments supporting the EU as the appropriate level of environmental reg-
ulation include: (i) the inability of Member States to solve trans-boundary environmental
issues, such as biodiversity, air and water pollution; (ii) the fact that subsidiarity does not
preclude EU lawmakers from regulating issues that do not have cross-frontier elements; (iii)
the claim that legal harmonization ensures a common approach is applied to all Member
States; and (iv) the fear that maintaining unilateral measures may exacerbate the distortion
of competition and create new barriers to free trade among Members States operating in the
EU Single Market (Sadeleer, 2012).
It was not until 1972 that an environmental agenda emerged from separate initiatives
in EU policy-making. To be more precise, it was only in the Single European Act of 1986
that the greening of European politics was first recognized (Staab, 2011). Then in 1992,
26Also known as the principle of conferral, the principle of legality in recognized under Article 5(1) of the
TFEU, which provides that ‘the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it
by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred
upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member State’.
27The principle of subsidiarity is recognized in Article 5(3) of the TFEU, which provides that ‘in areas
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at a central level or at
regional and local levels, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at Union level.’
28The principle of proportionality is recognized in Article 5(4) of the TFEU, stating that ‘the content and
form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’.
29Two requirements must be satisfied to ensure that the EU is the most appropriate decision-maker to
regulate environmental issues: (i) first, EU lawmakers have to demonstrate that the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States either at central level or at regional and local
level; (ii) second, they should also demonstrate that the proposed action by reason of its scale or its effects
can be better achieved at the Union level (Sadeleer, 2012; and Lenaerts, 1993).
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more formal inclusion arrived with the Maastricht Treaty, which officially linked the promo-
tion of sustainable growth to environmental protection. Since then, EU institutions have
increasingly taken over Member States’ authority to regulate environmental matters and to
control public and private activities affecting the environment across the whole EU. These
include standards addressing water quality and quantity, pesticides use, carbon emissions,
biodiversity and habitat protection, while other standards addressing soils have been left out
of cross-compliance.
Today, the large majority of environmental standards derive from EU-level regulation,
which has steadily replaced national legislation. Although the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) does not specify the normative instruments to be used by the
Union, Directives30 have been the most common instrument of Community legislation in the
area of environment, perhaps because they can be more easily adapted to national realities,
making them more politically appealing to Member States (Grossman, 1994).
Where the subject matter has been harmonized under Community law, Member States
must implement them and may not pursue environmental policies that conflict with EU law.
The timely and correct implementation of community law is a crucial step in the environ-
mental regulatory process. However, it should be mentioned that Member States still retain
much leeway in framing community laws to adapt to national and local realities. Member
States are also vested with a residual regulatory competence, which they can exercise in order
to maintain or introduce more stringent environmental protection requirements. As one can
30A Directive is a legislative act of the European Union, adopted by the European Parliament and the
Council, in relation to several environmental issues, and requires Member States to achieve a particular
result, but without dictating how they are to do so.
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imagine, the Directive approach has led to a high degree of variation on how community law
is translated into practice across Member States. In the end, Member States are the ones
responsible for establishing control and oversight regimes that apply the policing measures
associated with environmental protection and to sanction violations. For example, decisions
over granting an environmental permit for a plant to operate, conducting an environmental
impact assessment (EIA), and regulating waste are a matter for national, regional and even
for local authorities, not for the European Commission (EC).31
Although the Commission is recognized as the main driver behind the EU’s environ-
mental agenda, both in terms of administering policies and regulations and in prioritizing
key areas for activity, it has limited power to oversee implementation at the Member State
level. Because the EU Commission lacks the constitutional prerogative federal governments
possess, it can do little to ensure that community regulation is effectively enforced at the
national level. Instead, it has to rely on non-prescriptive efforts to convince Member States
of the importance of agreeing and implementing coordinated environmental policies (Staab,
2011). This scenario becomes even more complicated given that Member States have very
different positions and cultural attitudes toward the environment. Therefore, translating
environmental regulation from paper to practice has not been an easy task for the EU.
These challenges will be further elaborated in the context of CAP environmental measures
in Chapter 5, when an analysis of implementation at the Member State level using the UK
31The EU Commission is responsible for ensuring that treaty provisions and Community law are imple-
mented correctly at the Member State level. It can also initiate infringement proceedings against Member
States and, when necessary, bring claims to the European Court of Justice. The Commission is also vested
with the power to propose new legislation to the be voted in co-decision by the Council and the EU Parlia-
ment, and is an influential institution in the process of adopting EU law. In addition, the Commission issues
rules to implement some treaty provisions. For more information on the EU Commission see Staab (2011).
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as a case-study is made.
Implementation at the Member State level has been also driven by litigation and the in-
creasing ruling power of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).32 The CJEU has
played an important role in establishing the legal foundation and promoting harmonization
of community environmental policy. One of the most emblematic cases is the Commission
v. Denmark (1988), where the CJEU ruled that environmental protection may override the
free movement of goods, meaning Member States would still have the authority to regu-
late specific market conditions if necessary to protect the environment.33 It is important to
highlight, however, that the CJEU plays a secondary role in the EU judiciary system, as its
power is limited to what is necessary to guarantee the effectiveness and uniform application
of community law across Member States. The mainstream judicial enforcement of commu-
nity law against Member State authorities continues to take place in the national courts.
Thus, in this system, the authority of national courts and the initiative of private parties
play a key role to the functioning of the EU environmental protection system.
Other important drivers of EU environmental regulation are the formally recognized
union guiding principles. They are the precautionary-principle and the polluter-pays-principle,
both endorsed by the EU through treaties.34 While the precautionary-principle has served
32The CJEU consists of 28 independent judges assisted by 9 advocates general who present reasoned
opinion to the court. The court has jurisdiction to interpret the EU treaties, and to interpret EU law to
ensure they are applied in the same way in all Member States, and settles legal disputes between national
governments and EU institutions. It can also, in certain circumstances, be used by individuals, companies
or organizations to take action against an EU institution, if they feel it has somehow infringed their rights.
CJEU’s decisions are binding in their entirety, even though only as to those Member States and private
parties to whom they were addressed (Grossman, 1994).
33 The court’s ruling stated that a Member State’s national provision containing specific marketing con-
ditions for a specific good or service is legitimate when it is necessary to satisfy the mandatory requirement
of environmental protection (Case 302/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4607, 4630, 1 9, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 619, 631).
34Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=en.
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as a legal justification to sustain, for example, the EU’s ban on genetically modified crops
and inform several other aspects of EU environmental legislation under conditions of uncer-
tainty, the polluter-pays-principle has served as the legal bases for holding financially liable
any operator whose activity violates environmental laws and causes environmental damage
or imminent threat of such damage.
The extent to which these principles have been integrated into EU agricultural policies
and influence farmers’ adoption and implementation of best management practices, however,
has been limited. Although mechanisms to enforce the polluter-pays-principle may exist
in some Member States (e.g. fines), the diffuse nature of pollution from agriculture and
the difficulty in identifying the polluter has hampered enforcement and accountability for
damages. Further undermining the potential to apply this principle in agriculture is the fact
that farmers’ environmental violations are not usually linked to CAP supporting schemes,
and therefore do not affect their eligibility to receive payments (Grossman, 2006).
One principle that has been used often to justify CAP supporting schemes is the provider-
gets-principle. Under this principle farmers are expected to be compensated for providing
the public goods and services that are valued by society (multifunctionality). In essence, the
provider-gets-principle conflicts with the polluter-pays-principle in the sense that instead of
distinguishing farmers’ responsibility for making good use of the available natural resources
(and holding them accountable for any violations), the provider-gets-principle in part rec-
ognizes that society is the one that should bear the costs of environmental compliance, and
not farmers. Whether or not this should be the case deserves wider discussion in future
CAP reform negotiations, taking into account the impacts of such changes on farmers’ en-
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vironmental performance and outcomes, and making sure that programs consider farming
economic viability and global market competitiveness.
The emergence of environmental groups as influential and powerful actors has largely
contributed to the process of bringing environmental issues to agricultural policy debates.
Environmental organizations have also played a key role in environmental regulation through
the promotion of litigation. Particularly since the 1950s and 1960s, a broad spectrum of
interests and a large number of political organizations started to turn to the courts to bring
suit against government agencies, giving rise to global judicialization of political disputes.
While the increased use of litigation by environmental advocacy groups has been widely
witnessed, though little research has focused on exploring the factors driving these changes
over time.
Drawing from pluralist and corporatist-based conceptions of environmental advocacy
Morag-Levine (2003) ponders that rather than responding to changes in standing legal
norms,35 the judicialization of environmental politics has been associated to deeper pro-
cesses of separation between civil society and the government. She also suggests that legal
challenges to administrative decisions tend to be more frequent within pluralist systems
(e.g. the US), than in corporatist systems like Europe. According to her, this might be
explained by the fact that, in pluralist systems, there has been a considerable decline in
partnership ideologies within and outside the groups, making them more prone to engage in
35In law, standing or locus standi is the term for the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case.
In other words, standing refers to the capacity of a party to bring suit before the court to obtain a judicial
decision. In the US, recent changes the standing doctrine have opened more opportunities for environmental
organizations to sue government agencies.
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conflicts. In corporatist systems, on the other hand, there has been much more cooperation
between government and environmental groups. Thus, even within groups unaffected by
narrow standing rules, individuals are generally more reluctant to engage in conflicts with
the government. This gives more support to the argument that, beyond the standing-based
hypothesis, corporatists groups’ behavior has been driven by their larger patterns of collab-
oration with government institutions (Zeigler, 1988). The extent to which these ideologies
and patterns of collaboration amongst environmental groups, EU institutions and Member
States have influenced negotiations and implementation of CAP environmental objectives
is, however, beyond the scope of this work. Exploring these links and the politics behind
CAP negotiations may contain lessons to inform future integration and implementation of
environmental objectives. These are questions to be addressed in future research.
Against this background on how environmental policy-making has been theoretically and
legally framed in the EU, the following chapters will investigate how and to what extent EU
environmental regulation has been integrated into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
and how this has affected the allocation of agricultural subsidies to European farmers. Par-
ticularly driven by the multifunctionality paradigm, the EU CAP has been continuously
reformed to integrate environmental performance requirements. However, environmental
standards in agriculture continue to be generally implemented on a voluntary basis; farmers
are not legally bound to most environmental requirements if they do not apply for subsidies.
A detailed explanation of CAP environmental standards will be provided in chapter 5. Prior
that, however, the following section will lay out a conceptual framework to the briefly intro-
duced concept of multifunctionality as reviewed in the literature, and provide a theoretical
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basis for subsequent discussion.
4.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKOFMULTIFUNC-
TIONALITY
The concept of multifunctionality was first introduced in the context of the Rio Earth
Summit in 1992 (UNCED, 1992), and since then has been increasingly cited in policy and
scientific discussions on the future of agriculture and rural development. In the literature,
approaches to multifunctionality can be divided into four main categories: market-regulation,
land-use, actor-oriented, and public regulation approaches. Broadly speaking, multifunction-
ality refers to the ability of agriculture to produce, in addition to the marketable outputs
(e.g. food, feed and fiber), public goods and services that are valued by society. These
include, for instance, the management of renewable natural resources, the conservation of
biodiversity, the design of landscapes, and the contribution to the socio-economic viability
of the rural countryside.
At the policy level, discussions on multifunctionality have been largely driven by the
market-regulation approach following the conceptual framework provided by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2001). This notion emerged in
response to concerns over the legitimacy of government supports to agriculture and the lib-
eralization of global commodity markets. Drawing from a neoclassical-economic approach,
the OECD framework identifies two key elements describing multifunctionality : (i) the joint
production of multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs; and (ii) the fact that some
of the non-commodity outputs exhibit the characteristics of externalities or public goods
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for which market does not exist or functions poorly (OECD, 2001). Multifunctionality can
encompass both positive (e.g. functional landscapes) and negative (e.g. water pollution and
soil erosion) externalities; and it may also involve intangible goods, such as the spiritual and
symbolic value of preserving the countryside and its cultural heritage (Bohman et al., 1999).
Because commodity and non-commodity outputs in agriculture are jointly produced, any
policy that offers direct incentives or disincentives for the provision of the non-commodity
outputs to ensure that these outputs are supplied at desired levels has implications for
commodity production. In other words, any policy that limits or incentivizes the provision of
environmental outcomes by farmers may interfere in their capacity to produce commodities.
Thus, government intervention mechanisms affecting farmers decisions are directly linked to
multilateral agreements on agricultural trade liberalization. This is precisely the reason why
agricultural policies in OECD member countries have been so largely driven by decisions
made in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations.
By recognizing the inherent integration of commodity and non-commodity outputs in
agriculture, WTO member countries have found a way to justify the continuation of domestic
support within the scope of free trade agreements (OECD, 2001; and 2003). Under the
final WTO agreement on agriculture, non-trade-distorting support (including direct income
support) has been categorized as “Green Box” payments, exempting them from reduction
commitments. This means that Members could still provide domestic support to farmers
under ‘environmental and regional assistance programs.’ Green Box payments have to be
generally available to producers within the region and cannot be ‘related to, or based on,
the type or volume of production’ (otherwise known as decoupling). Furthermore, the size of
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these payments must be defined based on farmers’ income forgone as a result of the measures
implemented. While this approach has the advantage of requiring less complex measurements
(e.g. how much production has been lost due to the new scheme), the “Green Box” system
does not include a guarantee that payments are being targeted at specific outputs, thereby
having little capacity to drive changes toward sustainable aspirations.
As it can be seen, discussions on multifunctionality are closely tied to those on non-
trade concerns (NTCs) as both are central to the domestic policy of WTO Members, and
involve interests related to the protection of the environment, rural development, and food
security (Grossman, 2003; and OECD, 2001). Both multifunctionality and NTCs seek to
promote policies that are targeted, transparent, and cost-effective, and that maximize ben-
efits, and avoid distorting production and trade (Grossman, 2003). Some believe that the
term NTCs has ‘metamorphosed’ into multifunctionality, with some WTO Members using
the term multifunctionality to describe a range of agricultural non-trade concerns (Cairns
Group, 1999).
The multifunctionality debate is also inherently tied to that on sustainability, as both
are linked to positive and negative externalities arising from agricultural practices. The
main difference between them lays in the fact that while multifunctionality is interpreted
as a characteristic of the production process, sustainability takes a goal-oriented approach
(OECD, 2001). In other words, multifunctionality is used to described the multiple, inter-
connected outputs or effects deriving from agriculture; while sustainability encompasses an
idea of trajectory, which requires a comparative analysis against a baseline condition in order
to determine whether one set of actions may be better than another, based on criteria set
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by society following a political process (Endres et al., 2015).
Although multifunctionality is seen as a characteristic of the production process, it can
also entail a ‘normative’ value, referring to the multiple roles assigned to agriculture. In this
sense, agriculture as an activity is entrusted with the obligation of fulfilling certain functions
in society. For example, agriculture is expected to produce abundant and affordable food,
while at the same time taking into account the environment, maintaining rural landscapes,
and protecting the welfare of animals and the health of consumers (Abramovay, 2002). Con-
sequently, multifunctionality becomes not only a characteristic of the production process,
but a value in itself. Therefore, maintaining a multifunctional activity or making an activity
more multifunctional becomes a policy objective (OECD, 1998).
Multifunctionality in EU policy
The concept of multifunctionality, along with that of sustainability, was strongly supported
by the European Community in the WTO round of negotiations on agriculture (O’Neil,
2002). This vision was also manifested in the Commissioner Fischler’s statement when he
noted that the future model of agriculture must be based on the “multiplicity of functions
performed by the agricultural sector” (Fischler, 2003). These would include the market
function (served by more competitive prices), the environmental function (served by reward-
ing farmers’ efforts that benefit society), and the functions of rural areas (served by policy
instruments to promote rural development) (Grossman, 2003). In order to put these aspira-
tions into practice, new policy measures were to be introduced into the CAP, for example,
to directly reward farmers for the work they do to improve the environment, animal welfare
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and product quality (CEC, 2003). Within the scope of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), this vision has reflected in several reform processes, as will be discussed in chapter
5.
Policy drivers of multifunctionality were initially provided by countries’ commitments
to further progressive reductions in domestic agricultural support and trade barriers, shift-
ing away from policy measures that encourage higher levels of food production and input
use, toward measures that are less distorting of markets and trade. Currently, the con-
tribution of the multifunctionality debate goes above and beyond the simple decoupling of
payments away from production levels to farmers’ income support. It has opened the path
for discussions about the amount, distribution, and the very meaning of public support to
agriculture, not only within the WTO negotiations, but mainly within the European Com-
munity (Abramovay, 2002). Among both rural and urban communities across the EU, there
is growing public concern of the positive and negative effects of agriculture on the environ-
ment, an issue that now mobilizes a varied set of players that have come to question the
purely agricultural production orientation of public expenditures in the EU.
Nevertheless, despite all the efforts to fulfill multifunctional aspirations through CAP
subsidies, most European farmers continue to be entitled to payments without having to do
much for the environment and the community. As they exist today, CAP income support
systems do not fundamentally aim to pay for multiple-socially-valued functions, but instead
work as a simple form of guaranteeing major European agricultural products a place in the
world market. In this sense, multifunctionality has functioned as a simple language to justify
protectionist measures enacted in the guise of environmental objectives (Abramovay, 2002).
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Moreover, for the most part, it is not possible to establish a direct link between farmers’
income support schemes and the positive public externalities their agricultural activities
provide, and payment reductions applied to farmers who fail to comply with CAP standards
have not been sufficiently persuasive.36
Subsidies for multifunctionality
Within the political process, decoupling of payments carries the danger of creating in the
public a negative perception about the role of farmers and why it is important to support
agriculture (Medina & Potter, 2015). These concerns have led governments to increasingly
look for ways to ensure that payments compensate real outputs, and that these outputs
correspond in quantity, composition and quality to those demanded by society.
This debate has given rise to output-oriented subsidies, which are based on measurements
of the real benefits of practices implemented. Moving toward output-oriented payments, how-
ever, requires understanding and addressing site-specific considerations. This is because the
linkages between agricultural commodity and non-commodity outputs are largely influenced
by site-and-area-specific conditions. Among these factors are, for example, the availability
of farm-level data, new technologies and tools, and farmers’ experiences, which create new
ways of using a farm’s resources and influence the bundle of non-commodity outputs that
can be generated in the process. Agricultural research and development, in combination with
investments in farmers-knowledge, are potentially effective ways of modifying the linkages
that determine the non-commodity outputs of agriculture (Cooper et al., 2009). Public-
private partnerships can also make a substantial contribution to innovation and resource-use
36Special Report No 5/2011 on the Single Payment Scheme.
43
efficiency in agriculture, with efforts supported by research institutes, industries, universities
and government extension agencies. Governments may play also a key role in this process,
by providing the institutional support needed to facilitate the design and implementation of
outcome-based measures and payments.
Two aspects are of fundamental importance when designing outcome-based measures.
First, exploring the spatial scale and time dimensions of multifunctionality is crucial to
achieve improved results. The costs to individual farmers to maintain or improve the pro-
vision of public goods and services, and the quality of these services can differ substantially
across farms and within and across regions. Thus, ignoring differences in site productivities
and scale dimensions of non-commodity outputs can lead to local over- or under-provision
of these outputs. It is equally important to identify the appropriate administrative level at
which market or policy responses should be organized. Because ecosystems and watersheds
do not neatly fit within individual owner’s boundaries or even within state jurisdictional lines,
working across farms fences and state boundaries is needed if practices are to contribute to
ecosystem level functions and services (see Harden et al., 2013 for a discussion on patchwork
and interwoven multifunctionality).37 Second, questions concerning the length of time it
takes for a non-commodity output to be produced, the pattern of development it follows
during that period, the speed at which farming practices and systems can be adjusted, and
37Lessons learned in sustainability standards show the importance of translating individual practices into
landscape level improvements. In biofuels, standards systems have tried to develop “consumer” level stan-
dards that can provide a more meaningful measurement of environmental achievement, and allow for varying
levels of performance by individual producers in relation to identified ecosystem, watershed, and other shed-
level goals (Endres et al., 2015). Challenges remain, however, in gathering field and even sub-field level data
and accompanying verification costs, addressing complexity of analysis, and defining the system or “shed”
boundaries. For instance, seeking to improve spatial targeting and reflecting the complex nature of imple-
menting landscape scale schemes targeting multiple ecosystem services, European agri-environment schemes
have mostly focused on site-specific single objective measures.
44
whether a non-food concern is permanent or temporary need to be taken into consideration
in the design of policy measures targeting multifunctionality (OECD, 2001). Also, in order
to deliver the best of the environmental results, outcome-based payments need to shift from
top-down driven contractual agreements with individual farmers to how to integrate local
governance into payment design and delivery, and how to best support self-governance of
groups of related land managers (Schwarz et al., 2008).
One issue that may arise from a broader adoption of output-based payments is their
associated increased risk, as factors outside of farmers’ control (e.g. climatic conditions)
can largely affect non-commodity outcomes. In a purely outcome-based scheme, if a farmer
fails to achieve the required outcomes, he/she will not qualify for payments. Because CAP
payments form a significant proportion of total farm income for many EU farmers, the risk
of losing access to these payments may negatively influence farmers’ acceptability toward
output-based schemes (Schwarz & Morkevenas, 2012). One way to reduce risk would be by
introducing a flat-rate component into payments in addition to the result-oriented compo-
nent.
Expanding the use of outcome-based payments may offer the opportunity to change
historical distribution patterns of CAP subsidies, potentially diverting more money to the
most environmentally sustainable farmers who provides the most of the public goods (Cooper
et al., 2009). Before this occurs, questions remain about the extent to which the high
level of domestic support provided to European farmers over the past decades has truly
helped to foster the non-commodity outputs of agriculture, particularly in its environmental
component. Environmental objectives can be integrated into farming activities through many
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technical ways. Achieving these objectives requires not only navigating through complex and
integrative analysis to find the most suitable measures to achieve the targeted outcomes, but
also providing the institutional framework to facilitate the design and implementation of
environmental, socially and economically sound policies. The greatest challenge for the
research community and policy-makers has been to develop resilient agricultural systems
using rational and affordable strategies such that ecosystem functions and services can be
maintained and improved, and livelihoods can be protected.
In order to explore these questions, the next section will look into the institutional frame-
work within which CAP subsidies have been provided to farmers and how they have been
used to achieve environmental and rural development objectives that translate into multi-
functionality.
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Chapter 5
POLICY EFFORTS TO GREEN
THE EU COMMON
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
“As long as there are no mechanisms that reward farmers for the external benefits
and hold them accountable for the external costs of their activities, there is no
guarantee that agricultural support policies affect non-commodity outputs in the
desired direction.” (OECD, 2001)
5.1 PAST EXPERIENCES
Over the years, improvements in the environmental management of Europe’s farmland
have been achieved both as a result of environmental regulation and integration of environ-
mental standards into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). EU environmental regulation
has played an important role in controlling the more harmful farm practices (e.g. the use
of chemical inputs under the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive), as well as designating
priority areas and habitats for conservation, where farming practices have been restricted in
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return for compensation (e.g. habitat payments). The scope of these regulations, however,
is limited both because they do not cover all the environmental pressures (e.g. there is no
EU-level regulation on soils) or the existing regulation has not been fully integrated into
agriculture.
Since 1985, there has been a gradual acceptance that besides environmental regulation,
other sectorial policies, particularly the CAP, would need to address environmental issues.
Article 11 of the TFEU has specifically recognized that ‘environmental protection require-
ments must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and
activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.’ Because agri-
culture uses nearly half of EU territory, it becomes a central piece in any policy strategy to
address environmental problems. Also, as the largest source of funding currently available
to influence the management of rural land, the CAP can play a key role in leading farmers
toward more environmentally sustainable farming systems. In order to realize this potential,
over the past decades, environmental standards have been gradually integrated into the CAP
as preconditions for farmers to access subsidies. Understanding the evolution of the CAP
greening process, connecting it to wider EU environmental policy, and exploring how this
process has developed over time is an important step for those seeking to learn how the
current CAP regulatory framework operates to address environmental issues in agriculture.
The early days of the CAP
Elaborated by the Rome Treaty in 1957, and implemented in 1962, the CAP was initially
driven by the need to ensure European independence and food security (Zobbe, 2002). In
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its early stages, CAP measures followed previous national policies and were mainly focused
on supporting farmers’ income and promoting greater efficiency in agricultural production
(Wilson & Wilson, 2001). Although the CAP has been successful in achieving its market-
oriented goals, for many decades it completely neglected the negative externalities of agricul-
tural intensification, leading to overexploitation of the available natural resources and severe
environmental problems.
Over the past two decades, following discussions on multifunctionality, the protection of
the environment and the delivery of public goods by agriculture have become permanent
issues raised in policy debates, influencing changes in many aspects of EU agricultural pol-
icy and regulation. Among the major demands for policy revisions were: (i) decoupling of
agricultural subsidies from production levels, (ii) tying payments to targeted environmen-
tal objectives, and (iii) transferring funding from direct payments (Pillar 1) to the rural
development agenda (Pillar 2).
Responding to these demands, the CAP has undergone several important changes im-
plemented over five major environmental reforms: (i) the 1992 MacSharry reform; (ii) the
Agenda 2000; (iii) the 2003 Mid-term reform; (iv) the 2008 Health Check; and (v) the Post-
2013 reform. While negotiations on the MacSharry reform were mainly driven by the need to
accommodate commitments made in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and address bud-
get constraints; later reforms also were much more influenced by changes in policy paradigms
that shifted the CAP emphasis more toward the provision of public goods (multifunctional-
ity), particularly environmental and social benefits.
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The 1992 MacSharry Reform
Named after the Irish Agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry, the 1992 reform pack-
age was the first introduction of an environmental dimension to the CAP. While preparing
for the completion of the Uruguay Round38 negotiations, and trying to address environmen-
tal concerns in the farming and forestry sectors, the EU was under increasing pressure to
ensure that CAP payments were truly targeted at compensating the non-commodity out-
puts of agriculture and promoting sustainable practices. Although improving environmental
protection was one of the purposes of the reform, it was enacted separately from the CAP
commodity policy (Pillar 1 direct payments), appearing only as an accompanying measure.
Driven by WTO agreements, the reform’s main objective was to break the link between pro-
duction and subsidies in order to balance out the CAP budget, reduce production surpluses,
and control further environmental damages (Grossman, 1994).
In the EU, the MacSharry proposal coincided with the single currency project and the
development of a Single Market, whose aspirations for free movement of goods, services,
capital and labor were incompatible with trade distortion mechanisms implemented under
the CAP (Staab, 2011). There was a lot of pressure within and outside the EU to move
subsidies away from price support and replace them with non-production related measures
(income support). Instead of receiving a market price support, farmers started to receive
direct coupled payments.39
38WTO Negotiations on Agriculture.
39Prior to the MacSharry reform, the CAP payments served to support prices, not the product or the
producer. Following a reduction on price support schemes, coupled direct payments were introduced in
order to prevent a corresponding fall in the incomes of farmers. Under this new scheme, the profitability
of producing a product did not depend only on the price at which the farmer could sell the product in the
market, but also on the amount of direct payment that was associated with that particular product. Coupled
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Aside from granting coupled payments, the MacSharry reform also introduced “accompa-
nying” measures, including the establishment of compulsory set-asides,40 and a requirement
for Member States to establish national agri-environment schemes (AES). This represents
the first instance in which AESs become an integral part of CAP supporting schemes.41
Provided by Council Regulation 2078/92/EEC, the establishment of agri-environment
programs became mandatory for all Member States, which were obligated to design multi-
annual national or regional programs to encourage farmers to implement environmentally
sound practices.42 AESs constituted the first and positive step toward integrating environ-
mental components into the CAP. Participating farmers are entitled to payments in exchange
for the public benefits of farming which are calculated on the basis of farmers’ income losses
and implementation costs. (Grossman, 1994). Still today, these payments are co-financed
by CAP funds43 and Member States’ budgets.
Although these programs were made mandatory to all Member States following the Mac-
Sharry reform, individual producers’ participation remained voluntary. Also, at this stage,
CAP direct aid schemes were still exempt from environmental standards, and were mostly
payments and other measures regulating or supporting agricultural markets (e.g. tariffs, export subsidies,
intervention purchasing and output quotas) were 100 percent financed by the EU primarily through the
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF).
40This was a requirement for arable farmers to set 10 percent of their land aside to go fallow for a certain
period in order to minimize their production potential. These set-aside areas would only serve to control
production, and had no ecological objective tied to them. Only recently have set-asides been introduced into
the CAP to fulfill ecological objectives though the establishment of the Ecological Focus Areas under the
new greening measures. These measures will be discussed in section 5.2.2.
41Before the MacSharry reform, agri-environment measures were voluntary to Member States. They were
first introduced by Article 19 of Regulation (EEC) 797/85 which allowed Member States to make payments
to farmers who followed practices compatible with the environment in sensitive areas. However, only two
countries, Germany and the UK, had effectively implemented AESs in their territory (CEC, 1988).
42Member State agri-environment programs should be submitted to the EU Commission for approval, and
implemented to meet EU and Member States environmental objectives.
43Community co-financing was up to 75 percent of the cost of programs in less-developed regions, and up
to 50 percent in other regions (Regulation 2078/92, art.8); and the distribution of these funds across Member
States was not equal.
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focused on strategies to control surplus production, sustain farmers’ income and respond to
international trade commitments.
The Agenda 2000 Reform
Agenda 2000 was the EU’s second attempt to make the CAP greener. Also understood
as a “deepening” of the MacSharry reform, Agenda 2000 did not create new policy instru-
ments. Instead, it focused on adjusting existing schemes to address WTO commitments and
environmental issues, such as further cuts in intervention prices and an increase in direct
payments.
From 2000 onwards, the traditional mechanisms of price and income support were re-
labeled as “Pillar 1” of the CAP (income support Pillar).44. Another contribution of the
Agenda 2000 was the establishment of the new program for rural development, which would
comprise the CAP “Pillar 2” (Rural Development Pillar). The Rural Development Regula-
tion (RDR) brought together a number of pre-existing CAP measures under one umbrella
regulation. These include programs such as Agri-environment Schemes (AES) and Less Fa-
vored Areas (LFA, or ‘natural handicap areas’) currently supported under Pillar 2 funding.
At that time, EU funding for rural development programs would come from the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), but would later become incorporated
under the current European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD Regulation
1698/2005).
The restructuring of the CAP budget to create an independent Rural Development Pillar
44Direct payments were primarily financed through the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF),
so were other measures regulating or supporting agricultural markets.
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is often seen as the major contribution of Agenda 2000. But this did not actually lead to
practical changes as no additional funds were made available under Pillar 2. In fact, the
Agenda 2000’s major environmental contribution was to give Member States the authority
to make Pillar 1 payments conditional on farmers’ cross-compliance. This would mean that,
in order to access direct payments, claimants now had to comply with Statutory Manage-
ment Requirements (SMR) and maintain their land in Good Agricultural and Environmental
Condition (GAEC).45 These standards will be discussed in detail in section 5.2.1.
Furthermore, Member States could now modulate46 (reduce) direct payments in order
to relocate CAP Pillar 1 transfers to Pillar 2 to support other programs, including agri-
environment schemes (AES).47 While modulation has being favored by environmental groups,
who believe Pillar 2 subsidies can support more targeted environmental measures, it has been
unpopular among farmers, to whom modulation is seen as taking away money from income
support and putting it somewhere else48 (Medina & Potter, 2015).
Another important aspect of the Agenda 2000 reform is the fact that it was established in
the same year the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) (Directive 2000/60/EU)49 came
into force. This new regulatory framework opened opportunities to integrate EU water
quality and quantity standards to CAP cross-compliance requirements. Under the WFD,
45 Standards extracted from EU regulation in the fields of environment, food safety, animal health and
welfare.
46Modulation refers to the shift of funds from direct aid (Pillar 1) to rural development policies (Pillar 2),
by reducing transfers to larger farmers and relocating them to targeted rural development programs.
47Member States should spend at least 25 percent of their Pillar 2 transfers with AES.
48Because direct payments had been introduced to recoup losses from the lift of price premiums, reducing
CAP direct payment transfer would result in reducing farmers’ income.
49One of the integral parts of the Water Framework Directive is the Nitrates Directive, which has been in
place since 1991 with the objective of reducing water pollution caused or induced by nitrates from agricultural
non-point sources.
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Member States would be now required to maintain and restore the quality of both their
aquatic and adjacent terrestrial ecosystems, and to establish protection and enhancement of
these ecosystems relative to their water requirements. Achieving good ecological status of
water bodies necessarily requires Member States to reduce agriculture’s pressure on water
quality and quantity.50
The 2003 Mid-term Reform
A mid-term review of Agenda 2000 was proposed by the Commission in 2002, and ap-
proved by the Council in 2003. This reform represented another step toward aligning EU
agricultural policy with growing public demand for healthy and better quality food, and
environmentally-sound production methods that respect animal welfare principles (Fischler,
2003). The major contribution here was the decoupling of direct payments paid through the
Single Payment Scheme (SPS) or the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) under Pillar 1.51
Under the new SPS, direct payments would no longer be calculated based on certain
production activities and levels. Instead of production premiums, farmers would receive
annual income support payments, which would be calculated based on the volume of direct
payments they received during a reference period. This meant that farmers would no longer
need to plant certain crops or raise livestock in order to obtain financial support. Instead,
50In the EU, agriculture accounts for 33 percent of total water use and is the main source of water nutrient
pollution (ECA, 2014). Some 50-80 percent of the total nitrogen load of Europe’s freshwater stems from
agriculture non-point source pollution (EEA, 2011).
51In the EU-15, the Single Payment Scheme replaced most of the support previously provided under the
main CAP regimes (arable crop area payments, livestock headage payments, olive production subsidy, etc.).
For the EU-12 a specific direct payment scheme was introduced, the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS).
In this system, payments are calculated on a flat-rate basis per hectare of farmland for each Member State,
within a national budget ceiling. Supplementary payments may be made from national funds, and in some
cases different rates are paid for arable land compared with permanent grassland. The SAPS systems were
set to move to the SPS system by 2013 (EEA, 2009).
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direct payments would be linked to a given acreage of land (known as decoupling). However,
due to fears that the complete decoupling of payments could lead to the abandonment of
production in some sectors, Member States had the option to maintain certain coupled
payments alongside the Single Farm Payment (SFP). For instance, coupled payments could
be implemented for arable crops, suckler cows, sheep and goats (Regulation 1782/2003).
With the decoupling of direct payments, CAP Pillar 1 subsidies were moved into the
Green Box in WTO terminology and were no longer subject to reduction commitments. As
a result, multifunctionality was discouraged. This concept, however, continued to be used
in the arguments for the coupled payments maintained by Member States, particularly for
farming in marginal areas to prevent land abandonment.52
Cross-compliance, which had been introduced as a voluntary option for Member States
in the Agenda 2000, became mandatory with the 2003 Mid-term reform. This meant that,
from 2005 onwards, farmers would have to comply with 19 SMRs - five of which related to
the environment - and a number of GAEC standards. However, producers were not required
to formally very their compliance. Also, the reform maintained compulsory set-asides (e.g.
52There has been abandonment of production associated with decoupling in Less Favored Areas (LFA).
For instance, Scotland, which has 85 percent of its land categorized as LFA (only 6 percent of Scotland’s
land area is classified as ‘above average quality land’) and whose production alternatives are limited to
ruminant livestock production fed under an extensive grazing system, has experienced a strong decline in
the number of beneficiaries after the introduction of Single Payment Scheme. Part of the abandonment has
been explained by the Scottish authorities as due to older or less efficient farmers getting out of farming and
subleasing their land. The fact that there is an accelerated decrease in animal numbers maintained after
the introduction of SPS is a cause of environmental concern, especially in the more disadvantaged ‘hills and
islands’ areas or the fragile north-west region of Scotland. According to Scottish authorities, between 2005
and 2009, a 14.4 percent decline was observed in sheep numbers, and a 7.5 percent decline in cattle numbers.
Portugal has also faced similar problems, since it has a high proportion of its agricultural land located in
disadvantaged areas. The majority of sheep farming in Portugal occurs in areas with natural problems or
in marginal areas with no economically viable alternatives. In 2009, 53 percent of total ewe premiums were
paid to beneficiaries in the Alentejo region which is classified as LFA. After 50 percent of the ewe and goat
premiums were decoupled, there has been a sharper decline in sheep and goat beneficiaries in this region.
These examples show how decoupling has been associated to a higher risk of abandonment of production in
disadvantageous regions due to limited alternatives.
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fallow land), but were still intended to only serve as a supply control measure.
The 2008 Health-check Reform
In 2008 the EU Commission proposed the CAP Health Check package that contained
ambitious strategies to address evolving challenges faced by agriculture, including rising
global market prices, shifts in policy paradigms, and the need to move European agriculture
onto a more competitive footing in the international market (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2011).
Among the major changes were: (i) abolishment of arable set-asides,53 and (ii) the es-
tablishment of new deadlines to fully decoupling direct payments for the main arable crops,
some specialized crops, and most livestock payments. Member States would still be able to
maintain coupled payments for some sectors, including suckler cows, sheep and goats, and
also for some smaller sectors (e.g. tobacco). (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2011).
Following the implementation of the Health Check reform, guaranteed support prices
began to operate as safety net schemes, and support to farming took the form of largely
decoupled payments through Pillar 1, and more targeted interventions through Pillar 2. As
a result, today, the clear majority of direct payments are decoupled from production, and the
remaining market intervention mechanisms have been gradually phased-out (EEA, 2009).
The level of modulation agreed was rather less than the Commission had initially pro-
posed, and only farm businesses that were receiving SPS payments over e300k per year would
be taxed on those payments more heavily. The extra funds generated by modulation would
53The arable set-asides were an instrument that was very popular amongst farmers (because it helped
maintain market prices high), but problematic to environmental groups, who claimed land set-aside could be
best used to serve ecological functions, and that artificial mechanisms to control supply would eventually shift
production elsewhere, particularly to developing countries, where land is largely available and governance
structures to mitigate environmental and social tensions are usually weak.
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in part be used to fund rural development projects within the four priority areas: climate
change, green energy,54 water management and biodiversity (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2011).
Furthermore, Member States would now be allowed to transfer up to 10 percent of their
direct payment national ceilings to fund particular commodity sectors (options permitted
under Article 68 provisions). These funds could be targeted at protecting the environment,
improve the quality and marketing of products, or for animal welfare support. They could
also support payments for disadvantages faced by specific sectors55 in economically vulner-
able or environmentally sensitive areas.
Article 68 schemes to protect the environment were to be designed in the same way as agri-
environment schemes under Pillar 2,56 meaning they should be built using cross-compliance
requirements as a baseline, and could only cover implementation costs and forgone income.
By extending Article 68 options to include the protection of the environment, the Health
Check blurred the lines dividing Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 measures, making it now possible to have
100 percent EU financing for multi-annual environmental measures undertaken voluntarily
by farmers (Matthews, 2013a).
54This proposal coincided with the EU ambitious targets to reach a 20 percent share of renewable energy
consumption by 2020 (EU Renewable Energy Directive).
55Dairy, beef, sheep, and goats, and rice sectors.
56Some Member States have started to make use of this provision. Denmark, for instance, has used CAP
Pillar 1 transfer to fund schemes supporting permanent grassland under low-intensity use. Ireland, on the
other hand, has used funds to support schemes targeting local high nature value farming, while France has
transferred its grassland support scheme from Pillar 2 to fund it under Article 68 of Pillar 1. For more
details see Matthews (2013a).
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The CAP-post 2013 Reform
Discussions on multifunctionality were reopened in 2011 with the Commission’s proposal
for a new CAP reform, the CAP-post 2013.57 Instead of proposing a further rebalancing
of CAP expenditure between the two Pillars to support more environment- and climate-
friendly AESs, the Commission’s strategy put forward an ambitious and promising proposal
to tie a proportion of Pillar 1 direct payments to a set of new mandatory greening measures.
These would include: (i) crop-diversification, (ii) maintaining permanent grassland, and
(iii) Ecological Focus Areas. Besides greening, the proposal also included changes to some
GAEC standards, a revamping of Pillar 2 AESs, and a more prominent role for Farm Ad-
visory Services (FAS) in facilitating innovation to deliver climate change and environmental
objectives.58
Discussions were driven by the need to address some of the pressing environmental chal-
lenges arising from unsustainable farming systems across the EU, and to justify the con-
tinuation of a large budget for agricultural policy in the parallel negotiations on the future
of the EU’s long-term budget (Matthews, 2013b). What distinguished the CAP-post 2013
negotiations was that, for the first time, in the history of the CAP the European Parliament
played a key role in shaping the final agreement.59 This meant that negotiations were much
57The Commission Communication on the CAP toward 2020 was the initial document published on the
CAP post-2013 reform, which consisted of a synthesis of public debates and first propositions from the EU
Commission for a new CAP framework. This document is carefully produced because it stresses the main
ideas that the EU Commission wants the public to remember. It is the most complete document to represent
the general philosophy shaping the CAP reform. For more details see CEC (2010).
58Member States are legally obliged to set up national FASs offering advice to farmers. The advisory
activity must cover at least the SMRs and GAECs referred to in Articles 4 to 6 of Council Regulation
(EC) No 73/2009. Member States may decide to include other issues within the scope of their FAS as well.
Generally, FASs are coordinated and supervised by public bodies. The advisory bodies are selected via calls
for tenders and by designating private or public bodies to assist farmers.
59Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, improved the standing of the European Parliament
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more influenced by national interests and outside pressure than ever before. Add to this
the economic instability wrought by the 2008 financial crises and accompanying increased
demand for cuts in public expenditures, and public discontent with the democratic deficit
problem.
The CAP-post 2013 proposal gave rise to a lively and contentious debate around the
future of the CAP. After almost two years, negotiations were brought to a close in June 2013
when a political agreement was reached between the Commission, the European Parliament,
and the Council. The outcome was much less ambitious than what had been proposed, which
even then had been criticized by environmental groups, to whom the proposed measures were
not an adequate response to the current environmental challenges facing European agricul-
ture (BirdLife and others, 2011). Among the major changes were: (i) the establishment of
the new Pillar 1 greening measures ; (ii) changes and renumbering of some SMR and GAEC
standards; (iii) replacement of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) with the Basic Payment
Scheme (BPS);60 (iv) the establishment of the Active Farmer Test;61 and (v) a broadening
in the co-decision process. The EP is now an equal partner to the Council of Ministers when approving
legislation under the new so-called ordinary legislative procedure, giving it the right to both veto and amend
legislation. The EP also has now the power to approve the EU budget in its entirety, including the CAP.
This new provision has been an essential improvement of the democratic legitimacy of the EU.
60Since January 2015, all SPS entitlements have been transformed into BPS entitlements. Member States
will dedicate up to 70 percent of their Direct Payments national envelope to the new Basic Payment Scheme
(excluding any amounts committed for additional payments, e.g. Young Farmer top-ups, and other options
such as Less Favored Area top-ups) and “coupled”payments. For the EU-12, the end-date for the simpler,
flat-rate Single Area Payments Scheme (SAPS) system was extended until 2020. Eligibility for the Basic
Payment Scheme is a precondition for farmers to receive other direct payments such as the green direct
payment.The major difference between this and the old system is that the Basic Payment Scheme introduces
the element of the Active Farmer Test. To claim BPS each year, applicants must be an ‘active farmer’. For
more details on the new BPS scheme see infra note 40.
61The Active Farm Test will tell if a farmer does or does not qualify for Basic Payment Scheme (BPS). All
farmers with at least 36 hectares of eligible land will be able to apply for the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS)
as an active farmer. Also, farmers can qualify as an active farmer if they prove that their total agricultural
receipts are at least 40 percent of their total receipts in the most recent financial year. As part of this test,
the European Commission has required all Member States to classify their land which is ‘naturally kept in
a state suitable for cultivation and grazing’ and then decide the agricultural activity that needs to be done
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of the scope of AESs. All these changes will be addressed in more detail in the following
section on CAP standards.
Driving forces behind CAP negotiations
Historically, the CAP reform process has been driven by competing forces and policy
approaches. In one side of the debate, is the farming lobby that claims farmers’ reliance
on government protection and demands the continuation of CAP payments (state-assisted
paradigm).62 On the other corner of the discussion, are some Member States (such as the
UK) that believe CAP should be completely phased-out to free European agriculture from
trade distorting policies (competitive agriculture paradigm). Another influential lobby group
is represented by environmental organizations, which want for CAP subsidies to be more
effectively tied to the provision of public-goods (multifunctionality paradigm). The exercise
of these competing forces throughout several reforms has resulted in a multi-layered policy
built by an addictive process with specific mechanisms being placed on top of others, making
the CAP a very complex policy and creating structural challenges for implementation.
Despite all these competing forces and skepticism driving CAP negotiations, and farmers’
general reluctance to support further greening, the integration of environmental standards
into both Pillars of the CAP has shown relative progress in reducing some of agriculture’s
pressure on the environment (EEA, 2010b). For instance, run-off of nitrogen and phospho-
on it. Some have argued the Active Farmer Test represents a move back toward a productivist approach
in the CAP, linking subsidies to an element of production, and going on the opposite direction of decouple
payments. Others believe the Active Farmer Test is a way to ensure payments are not funding people who
are not engaged in farming activities.
62This approach holds the argument that agriculture needs protection because, different from most eco-
nomic sectors in modern societies, it is subject to unstable weather and market conditions, which are beyond
the control of the individual farmer.
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rous63 into waterways as well as greenhouse gases emissions have been reduced (EEA, 2011).
It should be noted, however, that these improvements coincide with a period of stagnation
in agricultural output growth in the EU, suggesting that along with policy changes, agri-
culture’s environmental performance has incentivized by economic downturns (Matthews,
2013b).
Environmental protection and the provision of public goods and services have not been
the only policy drivers underpinning CAP negotiations. Still today, major CAP schemes
continue to be deeply rooted in productivist approaches. There is evidence to suggest that
the CAP has not only fallen short in promoting public goods through subsidies, but it has
used multifunctionality as a convenient justification for maintaining government support to
farmers intact (Abramovay, 1999). Some believe multifunctionality has been used simply as
a language to give CAP payments some credibility, and has not been primarily explored to
influence the way farmland is managed to achieve multiple goals (Potter, 1998).
Today, the market context for food production and consumption is changing, and pro-
jections for future global food demand and prices suggest there will be strong incentives
to increase production in the coming decades (OECD/FAO, 2012). Adding further to the
demand for agricultural resources is the increasing consumption of biofuels and renewable
energy, which has put even more pressure on the competition for land within and outside the
EU (HLPE, 2013; and Searchinger & Heimlich, 2015). With the agricultural sector likely to
move again toward increasing production through improvements in productivity, CAP envi-
ronmental objectives run the risk of being left on the sidelines if Member States and farmers
63Phosphorus is contained in fertilizers and used in animal feed. It can cause water quality problems such
as eutrophication
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are given too much leeway to decide whether to make the environment a real priority for
farming.
Several studies provide evidence that Europe is still far from reaching a sustainable posi-
tion on the state of its environment (as extensively reviewed in Chapter 3). The continuing
environmental issues facing rural areas, the increasing pressures and uncertainties imposed
by climate change, concerns about food, energy and water security, and economic crises com-
bined require a fundamental review of the CAP framework, and a refocus of the policy to
ensure that public funding is truly used to consistently promote public goods and services.
5.2 CAP ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
Currently, the integration of environmental objectives into the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) relies on three major instruments. These are: (i) cross-compliance and (ii)
greening measures both applied to Pillar 1 direct payments, and (iii) the European Agri-
cultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) which provides for financial incentives for
environmental actions through Agri-environment Schemes (AES). While cross-compliance
and greening are standardized measures implemented across the whole EU with little room
for local adjustments, rural development and their AESs vary considerably across Member
States, as they are adjusted to address local priorities and conditions.
5.2.1 Cross-compliance (Pillar 1)
Introduced in 2003, cross-compliance is a mechanism that ties direct payments to compli-
ance with a series of standards and with maintaining agricultural land in good agricultural
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and environmental condition.64 These standards are currently set out in 13 Statutory Man-
agement Requirements (SMRs), and in 8 compulsory and 7 optional standards of Good
Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAECs) relating to soil erosion, soil organic
matter, soil structure, minimum level of maintenance of the land, and water management
and protection. While SMRs are mandatory standards extracted from pre-existing EU Di-
rectives and Regulation (e.g. Nitrates Directive), GAEC are voluntary standards defined and
administered by Member States and tailored to regional specificities, and for which there is
no specific reference in EU regulation.
Cross-compliance provisions
Cross-compliance requirements are year-round obligations that are linked to annual Pillar
1 direct payments. This means that in order to submit their applications to receive direct
payments, individual farmers must be in compliance with all SMRs and GAEC standards.
Failing to meet these requirements can lead to a reduction in CAP payments to the farmer.
With the CAP-post 2013 reform, some changes have been made to the cross-compliance
system. The main changes that are in effect since January 2015 are: (i) all of the GAECs
and most of the SMRs have been renumbered and some GAECs standards have been split
or merged into other rules; (ii) in order to qualify for Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) and all
the other payments, the land will need to be maintained in a state which makes it suitable
for grazing or cultivation, and the farmer must meet the new active farmer test.
64Cross-compliance was introduced in 2003 by Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 Septem-
ber 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and
establishing certain support schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No
1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999,
(EC) No 1673/2000, (EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001.
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Table 1: EU Framework for SMR Standards
SMR Number Content What changed with the 2013
reform?
SMR 1 Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) Formerly SMR 4
SMR 2 Wild birds Formerly SMR 1
SMR 3 Habitats Formerly SMR 5
SMR 4 Food and feed law Formerly SMR 11
SMR 5 Hormones Formerly SMR 10
SMR 6 Pig identification No changes
SMR 7 Cattle identification No changes
SMR 8 Sheep and goat identification No changes
SMR 9 TSEsa Formerly SMR 12
SMR 10 Plant protection products Formerly SMR 9
SMR 11 Welfare of calves Formerly SMR 16
SMR 12 Welfare of pigs Formerly SMR 17
SMR 13 Welfare of farmed animals Formerly SMR 18
Source: Defra, 2014. aTransmissible spongiform encephalopathies
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the new cross-compliance framework. Note that in Table 1,
not all of the 13 SMRs are related to the environment; only SMR 1, SMR 2, SMR 3, and
SMR 10 deal directly with environmental problems. For GAEC standards, on the other
hand, Table 2 reflects the EU general framework of compulsory and optional standards to
inform national settings of GAECs.
Member States enjoy a lot of flexibility in terms of how they apply cross-compliance
within the limits of the regulation, as many details on design and implementation of these
standards are left to their discretion. This provides much leeway to Member States to
implement these measures in a way that meets local and regional needs, and has worked as
a source of variation amongst Member States, particularly in relation to GAEC standards
(Allen et al., 2012).
To give an idea of how different GAEC standards can look like, Table 3 contains GAEC
buffer strip requirements from eight different Member States. As it can be seen, the require-
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Table 2: EU Framework for GAEC Standards
Issue Compulsory Standards Optional Standards
Soil erosion:
Protect soil through appropriate - Minimum soil cover - Retain terraces
measures - Minimum land management
reflecting site-specific condi-
tions
Soil organic matter:
Maintain soil organic matter lev-
els through appropriate practices
- Arable stubble management - Standards for crop rotations
Soil structure:
Maintain soil structure through
appropriate measures
- Appropriate machinery use
Minimum level of mainte-
nance:
Ensure a minimum level of
maintenance and avoid the dete-
rioration of habitats
- Retention of landscape fea-
tures, including, where ap-
propriate, hedges, ponds,
- Minimum livestock stock-
ing rates or/and appropriate
regimes
ditches trees in line, in group
or isolated and field margins
- Establishment and/or reten-
tion of habitats
- Avoiding the encroachment
of unwanted vegetation on
- Prohibition of the grubbing
up of olive trees
agricultural land - Maintenance of olive groves
- Protection of permanent
pastures
and vines in good vegetative
condition
Protection and management
of water:
Protect water against pollution
and run-off, and manage the use
- Establishment of buffer strip
along water courses
of water - Where use of water for ir-
rigation is subject to autho-
rization, compliance with au-
thorization procedures
Source: Annex III of Regulation (EC) 73/2009.
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Table 3: Wide Variation in GAEC Buffer Strip Requirements Across Member States
Country Buffer Practice
UK between 2m and 10m, depending
on the kind of input applied
maintain green cover (2m) and may not ap-
ply fertilizers or pesticides (10m)
Denmark minimum 2m no cultivation, soil treatment or planting
Greece between 1m and 6m depending
on slope and type of restriction
no cultivation (1m) or nitrogen fertilizers (2
or 6m)
Spain 2m to 10m compulsory scrub; no fertilizers or pesticides
France 5m compulsory grass cover, shrubs, bushes or
trees; no mineral, no organic fertilizers, and
no pesticides
Italy between 5m and 3m depending
on the state of the water body
compulsory grass cover, no tillage, no inor-
ganic fertilizers, no manure or slurry
Netherlands between 25cm and 9m depending
on the crop and certain technical
specifications
no fertilizers
Slovakia 10m no industrial or organic fertilizers
Source: ECA, 2014.
ments vary not only in terms of the size of the buffer strip, but also with respect to the
actions and practices farmers are expected or prohibited to take within their buffer zones.
For example, across the eight countries observed the minimum width of buffer strip can
range from 25 centimeters (Netherlands) to 10 meters (UK, Spain and Slovakia). Moreover,
in some Member States, certain categories of water bodies are exempt from GAEC on buffer
strip, even though these water bodies are not always properly defined, and the exemptions
granted are not grounded on scientifically-based justification.65 If an increasing number of
water courses are not obligated to comply with the buffer strip requirement, the potential
benefits of GAEC for water quality may be undermined.
65For example, in Italy, water courses shorter than 5 kilometers or belonging to a catchment area measuring
less than 10 square kilometers do not require buffer strip. On the other hand, in Spain, ponds, irrigation
channels and ditches are generally exempt from GAEC on buffer strip.
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Implementation
Because Member States are in charge of implementing cross-compliance measures at the
individual farm level, two major challenges arise from this system. First, implementation
of SMRs requires effectively integrating specific elements of EU regulation into national or
regional legislation and concretely defining SMRs to fit national priorities and conditions
(harmonization).66. Only a few concrete farm level SMRs have been legally defined at farm
level by the Commission. Second, the implementation of GAEC requirements entails the
design and establishment, by national authorities, of relevant standards and prescriptive
managements practices farmers are expected to implement, leaving considerable scope for
variation in national definitions. 67 As a result, some Member States have defined very light
and flexible standards for cross-compliance to minimize administrative costs and reduce risk
of cuts on CAP funding (Farmer & Swales, 2004).
Member States are responsible for informing farmers about these requirements and es-
tablishing an administration and control system that allows a sample of beneficiaries to
be verified for compliance. Penalties, in the form of payment reductions, are imposed on
farmers who fail to comply. Progress in implementation has largely varied across the wide
EU, with gaps observed in various Member States (Farmer & Swales, 2004; and Bennett et
al., 2006). In order to track implementation, all the information collected by Member States
through farm level verification audits is submitted to the EU Commission, which is in charge
66Because national authorities are required to enforce farmers’ compliance with these standards, this has
the potential to strengthen the application and enforcement of EU environmental standards in agriculture
at the Member State level. Poor enforcement or delays in implementation may lead to penalties, including
reduction on CAP transfers.
67For example, when defining soil protection and management requirements for uncultivated land.
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of overseeing implementation of SMR and GAEC standards through a desk review process.
However, inconsistence and incompleteness of data reported by Member States has led to
gaps in monitoring and enforcement of cross-compliance implementation.
Improving monitoring and enforcement capabilities at both Member State and the EU
levels should be a priority to ensure farmers’ full compliance with mandatory standards. This
requires developing and applying more operational agri-environment indicators, improving
data collection and availability, and further developing mapping capabilities. Besides facil-
itating the monitoring of cross-compliance, these instruments can inform adaptive manage-
ment, and help Member States and the EU to set priorities for the design of future policies.
Lastly, strengthening the national Farm Advisory Systems (FAS)68 to make sure farmers are
receiving the appropriate assistance to understand and implement standards is crucial for
the successful implementation of cross-compliance.
Because cross-compliance are mandatory to all farmers accessing CAP payments, it has
the been the major source of environmental regulation through subsidies. Despite this poten-
tial, cross-compliance has partially failed to achieve real improvements on the ground. Other
standards remain to be integrated into the set of cross-compliance requirements. These in-
clude, for instance, other water quality and quantity standards set under the WFD, and soil
conservation standards that were to be established under the proposed EU Soil Directive.69
68An evaluation carried out by the Commission (COM, 2010) pointed some of the problems with imple-
mentation of Member States’ FASs suggesting the need for improvements. These include: (i) extending the
scope of the FAS to encompass issues that go beyond cross compliance requirements, (ii) make it clear that
FASs are designed to assist not only farmers receiving CAP payments, but all farmers, (iii) distinguishing
between advisory and monitoring services, (iv) promoting farmers’ awareness about the FASs services, and
(v) improving the management of these advisory systems.
69In September 2006, the European Commission (EU) adopted a Soil Thematic Strategy (COM(2006)
231) in order to provide a comprehensive common framework for protecting soils across the European Union.
However, because no agreement was reached, in April 2014 the Commission withdrew its proposal, frustrating
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Although there are cross-compliance standards addressing other environmental issues
such as biodiversity and soils (e.g. GAECs to protect soils from erosion and establishing
minimum of level soil cover), for practical reasons, this thesis only critiques standards tar-
geted at water quality and quantity. The other aspects of cross-compliance will be object of
future research.
How does cross-compliance address water issues?
There is sufficient evidence to sustain that agriculture remains the single sector most
affecting water quality, typically through diffuse pollution processes (EEA, 2010a). Six
cross-compliance requirements have a direct impact on water quality and quantity. Their
implementation at the Member State level, however, has faced many challenges, with sta-
tus of water quality varying significantly across Europe. For instance, violations of cross-
compliance rules protecting water in Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ)70 have been observed
promises to improve soil protection in the EU. Supporters of the directive have argued that a soil directive
is important to help fight climate change because of the role soil plays as a carbon repository. Environment
ministers from some Member States (in particular, the UK, Germany, Austria) however, have taken the
position that the directive would interfere with their existing soil management measures and that it would
be too costly to justify its environmental benefits. At the moment, only a few EU Member States have
specific legislation on soil protection.
70In place since 1991, the EU Nitrates Directive (ND) regulates nitrate pollution of ground and surface
waters from agricultural sources. Under this Directive, Member States are in charge of identifying polluted
and threatened water bodies and designating Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ), within which farmers are
required to implement compulsory action programs respecting a Code of Good Agricultural and Environ-
mental Practice (CGAEP), and taking additional measures when necessary, such as manure processing and
restricting fertilizer application. Implementation of the Nitrates Directive has become an integral part of
the WFD. However, after more than twenty years since the ND has come into force implementation remains
a challenge for some Member States. For instance, in 2013, cases of violation related to the correct and
complete implementation of the directive, as well as the appropriateness of the action programs were still
being litigated against eight Member States (Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Greece, France, Latvia, Poland
and Slovakia) (ECA, 2014). Among the cases ruled by the European Court of Justice are claims that some
Member States, such as France, had failed to designate several areas as Nitrate Vulnerable Zones, where
nitrate concentrations in ground water were above 50 mg/l (the maximum concentration allowed in drinking
water) or the surface water risked eutrophication if no action plans were implemented. When implementing
the Nitrates Directive, Member States present nitrate action programs with varying degrees of ambition.
Because these programs do not require approval by the Commission, there are significant differences among
the criteria used by Member States when defining vulnerable zones or the actions to be taken. Recent EEA
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in many Member States. These include inadequate storage of manure, inefficient applica-
tion and monitoring of fertilizers, absence of nutrient management plans, and nitrate output
beyond maximum levels (ECA, 2014). Problems with the implementation of other cross-
compliance rules related to groundwater protection, plant protection products, and buffer
strip have also been identified (ECA, 2014).
Water cross-compliance requirements also continue to leave out standards to limit the use
of phosphorus71 on farmland and to control the application of pesticides72 near water bodies.
Pesticides are widely used as a strategy to protect plants and crops from damage caused by
weeds, diseases and insects, and are generally identified as plant protection products. Only for
certain very dangerous pesticides, Member States can, when authorizing their use, establish
buffer zones along water courses in which spraying is prohibited. It is worth mentioning,
however, there have been initiatives in some Member States to control pesticide use, by
adding restrictions in GAEC provisions on buffer strip. Moreover, the Commission has not
specifically defined the GAEC standards on irrigation systems such as water abstraction
permits, water meters, and reporting on water use; leaving the matter to be regulated under
existing national or regional legislation, when these exist.
Although cross-compliance has generally increased awareness among farmers and trig-
gered some changes in farming practices particularly in relation to water (ECA, 2014), its
reports show that the current trend in nitrate levels across the EU is not likely to reach good status even by
2027. Therefore, despite progress made on nitrate concentrations partly due to measures to reduce nitrate
inputs in agriculture, additional measures are needed to reduce diffuse pollution if the majority of water
bodies are to achieve high or good ecological status by 2027. The pressures from agriculture on water bodies
continue to be significant. Diffuse and point source pollution by nitrogen was reported in 91 percent of the
dRBMPs evaluated, phosphorus in 90 percent of the cases, and pesticides in 69 percent of them (EEA, 2011).
71Nitrogen application is controlled under the integration of water quality standards under the Nitrates
Directive into cross-compliance, with control of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ).
72See infra note 21.
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impacts on overall water quality and quantity across European farmland have so far been
limited. Part of the problem lies in intrinsic limitations of the cross-compliance system in
both designing standards and verifying compliance. This occurs because some requirements
are very difficult to check, whether because inspector visits are usually notified in advance, or
because some elements of compliance can only be checked during a certain period of the year
or at certain conditions, which may not always coincide with the timing of the inspection
(ECA, 2014).
Implementation of cross-compliance standards is further eroded by a weak enforcement
system. Penalties applied to non-compliant farmers do not account for the environmental
and economic costs of violation, compensating only a portion of direct and indirect costs
of environmental damage. In this sense, cross-compliance has failed to apply the polluter-
pays-principle to hold accountable non-compliant farmers. For instance, in the Netherlands,
although phosphorus requirements have been included into nitrates action programs, viola-
tions of those standards are not subject to penalties.
5.2.2 2013 Greening Measures (Pillar 1)
Instead of raising the cross-compliance baseline in Pillar 1 or favoring the transfer of funds
to more targeted measures in Pillar 2, the Commission’s strategy in the CAP-post 2013 went
in a different direction, and set forth new greening measures that are now tied to 30 percent
of Pillar 1 direct payments.
When initially proposed by the Commission, these measures were intended to apply to
all farmers receiving direct payments, and were supposed to represent a step further in
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environmental performance beyond cross-compliance. The Commission preferred the new
greening measures to be applied to Pillar 1 because of the simplicity and enforceability of its
annual measures. Implemented under Pillar 1, greening offered the possibility for a broad
scale coverage of standards beyond that currently possible through voluntary and selective
agri-environment schemes (Allen et al., 2012). More importantly, greening would provide
an additional justification for maintaining the Pillar 1 budget of the CAP by raising the
environmental baseline of CAP direct payments (Matthew, 2013a).
Despite all these promises, the final rule approved in 2013 significantly watered down im-
portant elements of the Commission’s proposal, to such an extent that the additional benefits
for the environment are expected to be minimal (Matthews, 2013b). Several exemptions were
granted and loopholes were included in the final deal. Recent estimates suggest that at least
88 percent of EU farmers and about 50 percent of farmed land will be exempt from the new
greening measures (Pe’er et al., 2014). For Matthews (2013), the EU has missed a great
opportunity to take a step forward on making the CAP fit for the 21st century, and meeting
the food, natural resources and territorial challenges of the future.
Chapter 3 of the Regulation (EU) 1307/2013 entitled ‘Payment for agricultural practices
beneficial for the climate and the environment’ sets out the greening payments component in
more detail. Article 43(2) identifies the three greening practices as: (i) crop diversification
(also labeled as crop rotation); (ii) maintaining existing permanent grassland ; and (iii) having
Ecological Focus Areas (EFA) within the agricultural area. These practices are further
defined in Articles 44 to 46, respectively.
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(i) Crop diversification
Over the last century, the world has lost 75 percent of its crop varieties. Today, 75 percent
of the food we eat comes from only 12 plants (including corn, soybeans, wheat, etc.) and 5
animal species (BirdLife and others, 2011). Less diverse agricultural systems have become a
reality to many farming communities across the world, with large implications for soil quality
and composition (EEA, 2004). Crop monocultures also have been determined to impact
biodiversity of agro-environments and reduce natural habitat for birds, pollinators and other
beneficial insects (Garibaldi et al., 2013). This occurs because most large-scale conventional
agricultural systems exhibit poorly coordinated farm components, with almost no integration
between crops, soils, and animals, otherwise know as permaculture, biodynamic systems, etc.
Emphasis on efficient food production systems supported by CAP intervention mechanisms
also has encouraged continuous arable cropping, winter cereals, and minimal rotations, all
resulting in negative consequences for the soil (Ingram & Morris, 2007).
At the same time, a vast array of studies have linked crop diversity to several environmen-
tal and agronomic benefits, including greater stability of natural ecosystems (Tilman et al.,
2006; and Harrison, 1979), reduced yield variation, and improved crop resilience to multiple
environmental stresses (Gaudin et al., 2015). These are advantages that are tremendously
valuable for today’s agriculture given expected changes in climate, and increasing global
demand for agricultural products. Crop diversification can improve agricultural resilience in
a variety of ways. For example, by promoting a greater capacity to control pest occurrences
and reduce pathogen transmission, which may worsen under future climate scenarios, and by
buffering crop production from the effects of greater climate variability and extreme events
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(Lin, 2011).
Aware of these threats and opportunities for the long term viability of European agri-
culture, scientists and politicians have proposed changes in land use and management to
improve European crop diversity. For over a decade, crop diversification/rotation has been
set as an optional GAEC standard, and in some Member States it has been adopted as
a soil conservation measure under agri-environment schemes. However, despite its proven
benefits, adoption of crop diversification among European farmers, although improving, has
been limited. Economic incentives encouraging production of a selected few crops, the push
for biotechnology strategies, and the general belief that monoculture is more productive than
diversified systems are among the reasons why farmers have not been apt to diversify their
farming systems. Thus, by making crop diversification one of the new mandatory greening
measures, the EU hopes to improve its adoption across European farmers.
Also known as the 2 or 3 crops rule, crop diversification requires landowners to grow at
least two or three varieties of crops on their arable land, depending on the farm size and the
type of crops grown. If a farmer has between 10 and 30 hectares of arable land enrolled in
direct payments, he/she will have to maintain at least 2 different crops, where the largest
crop must not cover more than 75 percent of the total arable land. Alternatively, if a farmer
has more than 30 hectares of arable land, at least 3 different crops will have to be grown;
where the largest must not cover more than 75 percent of the arable area, and the two largest
crops together must not cover more than 95 percent of the arable land.
Temporary grassland73 or fallow land can count as the main crop if: (i) it covers more than
73Temporary grassland is land that has been in grass or other herbaceous forage for less than 5 years
(Defra, 2014)
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75 percent of the arable land, and (ii) the remaining arable area is larger than 30 hectares. In
this case, the farmer will not need to reduce the percentage covered by temporary grassland
or fallow land. However, at least 2 other crops need to be grown on the remaining arable
land, and the main crop on this remaining arable land must not cover more than 75 percent
of this land.
Several exemptions to the crop diversification rule were included in the final CAP agree-
ment, however (Table 4). Any farmer who qualifies for the exemptions will receive the
greening payment without having to do anything differently. Aside from these exemptions,
permanent crops74 and all farmers enrolled in the Small Farmer Scheme75 also were generally
exempted from crop diversification. To put this into perspective, small landholdings (<10ha)
represent 92 percent of all arable holdings in new Member States and 13 percent of the total
arable area across the EU (Pe’er et al., 2014).
Questions remain about whether applying the 2 or 3 crops rule in intensively managed
farms will be an effective strategy to enhance biodiversity. Add to this the fact that these
2-3 crops targets are even lower than the current average crop diversity at the farm level in
74Permanent crops mean non-rotational crops other than permanent grassland and permanent pasture that
occupy the land for five years or more and yield repeated harvests, including nurseries and short rotation
coppice (Regulation (EU) 1307/2013).
75Wide variation and big contrasts exist in farm structures across the EU. In total, the EU-28 has ap-
proximately 12.2 million farms with an average size of 14.2 hectares. A large number (6 million) of these
holdings are considered very small (less than 2 ha in size) and take only 2.5 percent of the total land area
used for farming in the EU. A small number (2.7 percent of all holdings) consists of large landholdings (over
100 ha) that farm 50.2 percent of the EU farmland. 44.6 percent of the farms have a standard output below
e2,000, and most of the smaller farms are characterized as semi-subsistence farms, meaning that more than
50 percent of their output is self-consumed. Defining small farmers can follow various criteria, including farm
size, the use of family labor, farming output, and the percentage of self-consumed outputs. Establishing a
common definition of small farm across the 28 Member States remains a challenge for the EU, with each
Member State having their own definition (COM, 2011). For instance, in the UK, small farms are those
with less than 5 ha of arable land, which are not entitled to BPS payments, but qualify for Small Farmers
Scheme. In Germany, on the other hand, farms with less than 95 ha can participate in the German Small
Farmer’s Scheme as they qualify as small and medium enterprises (SME).
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Table 4: Crop Diversification Exemptions
Exemption A
More than 75 percent of the arable land is under:
- fallow land
- temporary grassland
- a combination of the above and the rest of the arable land is 30 hectares or less
Exemption B
More than 75 percent of the total eligible agricultural area is under:
- permanent grassland
- temporary grassland used for the cultivation of crops grown in water
- a combination of the above and the rest of your arable land will be 30 hectares or less
Exemption C (transitioning from SPS to BPS)
The farmer has new land and different crops. There are two parts of this exemption:
1. More than 50 percent of the arable land declared on the BPS application was not
declared on the SPS application in the previous calendar years and
2. All the arable land parcels declared on the BPS application must be used to grow a
different crop from the previous calendar year
Source: Adapted from Defra, 2014.
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many Member States. Further undermining the system is a complete lack of requirements
regarding eligible crop types or rotation. All these factors combined challenge the ability of
the crop diversification measure to deliver real benefits to biodiversity and soil quality, and
to reverse the level of landscape homogenization in the EU.
(ii) Permanent grassland
Permanent grassland76 can provide several environmental benefits. In particular, it can
serve as habitat for a vast number of species and has a great capacity to sequester and
store carbon (Ward et al., 2014). Compared to other farmland uses, permanent grassland
under extensive use are of exceptional importance for biodiversity. However, driven by CAP
intervention mechanisms, abandonment of semi-natural grassland in marginal areas has led
to continuing decline of farmland biodiversity.
Several EU policies and regulation targeting biodiversity and GHG have been used to
protect permanent grassland (e.g. directives on habitats and birds). For instance, various
types of permanent grassland have been listed in Annex 1 of the Habitats Directive as farm-
land habitats that require continued farming use for their conservation.77 Recognizing the
role of agriculture in maintaining and enhancing the protection of these habitats, permanent
grassland has also been addressed in some CAP cross-compliance requirements, and targeted
in agri-environment schemes in some Member States.
These efforts, however, have not been enough to maintain or improve current level of
permanent grassland cover across European farmland. In fact, recent estimates show that
76Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 1307/2013, any land that has been covered by grass or herba-
ceous forage naturally (self-seeded) or through cultivation (sown) and that has not been included in the crop
rotation of the holding for more than 5 consecutive years can qualify as permanent grassland.
77Some 40 of the approximately 200 habitats listed consist of permanent grassland.
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grassland habitats have decreased in cover by 6.4 percent between 1993 and 2011 in the
EU, and by 11.8 percent in new Member States, giving rise to biodiversity loss and GHG
emissions (Pe’er et al., 2014).
In an attempt to improve protection of these high conservation value ecosystems, the
latest CAP reform has set the maintenance of permanent grassland as one of the new greening
measures. However, rather than working toward maintaining and improving the conservation
status of these habitats, the CAP final rule allows for a reduction of up to 5 percent in the
net area of permanent grassland at national or regional level, and also has established several
exemptions that open up doors for further conversion.
The permanent grassland rule can be divided in two parts. First, the percentage of per-
manent grassland in a Member State - compared to the area of agricultural land - may not
fall by more than 5 percent. If the actual ratio falls by more than the 5 percent thresh-
old, individual farmers who have plowed permanent grassland may be required to restore it.
Second, areas of permanent grassland that are covered by the Birds and/or Habitat Direc-
tives (Natura 2000 sites) cannot be plowed up irrespective of the total amount of grassland
currently maintained at the national level.
Farmers are required to identify the amount of permanent grassland they have on their
lands, as this will count toward their eligible agricultural area78 for payments and will help
determine if they qualify for any exemptions from greening. For instance, exemptions to per-
manent grassland greening apply to land covered by permanent crops. These areas represent
9.3 percent of the total agricultural area across the EU.
78Eligible agricultural area consists of any area taken up by arable land, permanent grassland, or permanent
crops (Regulation (EU) 1307/2013).
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If a land parcel that meets the definition of permanent grassland contains scattered trees,
it will only be classified as permanent grassland if it is suitable for agricultural production,
and does not have more than 100 trees. This rule has been highly criticized by environmental
groups because of its lack of agronomic and ecological basis, as pastures with a high density
of shrubs and trees have been in active use by farmers for thousands of years. If sustainably
use, high density grassland can provide several benefits, including sustaining biodiversity
and landscapes, and helping control fire occurrences (BirdLife and others, 2011).
Besides wide exemptions, no habitat quality and management criteria have been set to
ensure farming operations on permanent grassland will be performed appropriately, thus no
safeguards exist to further degradation. Furthermore, outside the areas identified within
Natura 2000 sites and protected by Member States as high conservation value grassland
no restrictions apply. This means that outside protected sites, farmers will still be able to
convert low-input, extensively managed, species-rich grassland to highly intensified, uniform,
species-poor farmland. The potential to maintain grassland biodiversity is further under-
mined by incomplete mapping, lack of differentiation among regions and grassland types,
and a focus on net area without consideration of continuity and connectivity of existing
semi-natural grassland parcels (Pe’er et al., 2014).
(iii) Ecological Focus Areas
The EFA concept has been drawn from the Swiss model of Ecological Compensation
Areas,79 and also borrowed from elements and specific practices implemented under entry-
79The Swiss O¨kologischer Leistungnachweis (O¨LN) was developed as a proposed means of retaining the
environmental benefits of set-aside following its abolition under the 2008 CAP Health Check. This policy
measure is already used in Switzerland, where farmers are required to keep seven per cent of their land as
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level type agri-environment schemes in some Member States (Allen & Hart, 2013). Ecological
Focus Areas (EFA) are areas and/or landscape features which the EU has identified are
beneficial for the climate and the environment. Under the new greening measures, farmers
with more than 15 hectares of arable land must set aside at least 5 percent of their total
eligible land as EFAs.80 As referred to in Article 46 of Regulation (EU) 1307/2013, these
include areas not used for production, such as: land left fallow, terraces, landscape features,
buffer strip, agro-forestry areas, forest edges, and afforested areas.
There were initial promises that EFAs would contribute toward a range of different en-
vironmental objectives, including biodiversity, soil and water quality, climate change mit-
igation and adaptation, pest control, landscape protection, and pollination (CEC, 2010b).
The CAP final regulation provides that EFAs should serve, in particular, to safeguard and
improve biodiversity on farms. However, other less ecologically-focused land-uses were added
to the final list of qualifying areas, which were classified as land under low-input agricultural
management.81 These include land covered by nitrogen-fixing crops (legume crops), catch
crops, green cover crops, and areas with short-rotation coppice.
Although land under low-input agricultural management can help maintain soil and water
quality to some extent, few empirical evidence exists to show they can improve biodiversity.82
‘ecological compensation areas’ as a precondition to receive direct payments.
80The Commission proposal required farmers to ensure at least 7 percent of their eligible hectares, excluding
areas under permanent grassland, as EFA.
81As long as there is no use of mineral fertilizer and/or plant protection products.
82While the positive effect of plant species richness on productivity is uncontroversial, doubts have been
raised about the long-term stability of this relationship and its relevance for applied conservation. For
instance, some studies have show that implementation of AES targeted at increasing the population of
pollinators can have a positive effect on yields (Bullock et al., 2007; Klatt et al., 2014. More specifically,
Bullock et al. (2007) show that the restoration of species-rich communities of conservation value can increase
agriculturally relevant hay production and that this effect is maintained over at least 8 years.
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In fact, in some cases adverse impacts may result from their cultivation (e.g. from plough-
ing, stubble incorporation, application of pesticides) (Ehlers et al., 2014). In the case of
nitrogen-fixing crops, for instance, ecological benefits largely depend on the management
practices implemented and the crop species grown. Although these crops have a potential
to increase structural diversity and positively impact soil fertility, sufficient added value in
terms of species diversity is unlikely to be achieved in the absence of mandatory management
requirements.
Another aspect that might open some loopholes on how EFAs are implemented is the
establishment of the weighting factors for certain types of landscape features or land-uses.
Member States are free to set these weighting coefficients, taking into account the ecological
significance of the eligible features and land-uses. An EFA weighting matrix can be useful
in principle, especially for areas subject to productive use. However, it can open gaps
for Member States to make compliance more flexible to farmers, and ultimately lead to a
reduction of the total land actually devoted to EFAs. For instance, in the UK hedges and
buffer strips were set weights of 10 and 9, respectively. That is, every 1 meter of hedges
is worth 10 square meters of EFA area.83 In such a diluted form, and lacking specific
management guidelines, EFAs are expected to contribute little to biodiversity and other
ecosystem services.
Other implementation challenges are likely to reduce EFA’s potential to deliver environ-
mental benefits. First, the implementation of AES type measures in the form of EFAs within
83The way this system works is that, for example, if certain landscape feature is declared eligible for EFA
purposes and a weighting factor of 0.3 is applied to it, it means that 15 hectares of this landscape feature
would qualify as 4.5 ha of EFA (15 x 0.3 = 4.5).
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the scope of CAP Pillar 1 will be limited by the bounds of the direct payments regulation.
This means EFAs will have to encompass simpler practices so they can be implemented with
minimal cost and technical advice, be established annually in line with direct payments, and
follow a non-contractual format so farmers can change their practices and feature locations
every year. This raises the question as to the potential impacts of changing the selection and
management of EFA features between years (Allen et al., 2012). In addition, in order to qual-
ify as EFAs, landscape features must be located within the farm’s eligible agricultural area
for direct support. This restriction can be an issue for those traditional landscape features
that are not farmed (e.g. hedgerows, stone walls, buffer strip), as they are often excluded
from the eligible agricultural area in most Member States, and are generally not mapped or
recorded on the EU Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS).84 Technical and structural
capacity to map and record these ecological features is not only important to allow them to
be counted as EFA, but also to support their implementation, monitoring and evaluation,
and integrate them into broader water quality and biodiversity policies. Inevitably all of
these shortcomings are likely to affect the delivery of environmental benefits through EFAs.
Further undermining EFA’s potential to provide additional ecosystem functions and ser-
vices is a provision that generally exempts from EFAs: (i) small farmers,85 (ii) farms with
permanent crops, and (iii) grasslands or pastures. The farm size threshold exemption will
keep at least 88 percent of EU farms and over 48 percent of the farmed area free of EFA
84The Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) is the key component of the Integrated Administration
and Control System (IACS) for area based subsidies. It is the modern supporting tool in the form of a
spatial register used within an IACS environment that helps the farmer who intends to apply for aid under
any of the area-related aid schemes to register agricultural reference parcels considered eligible for annual
payments of CAP subsidies.
85Farms up to 15 hectares.
82
(Pe’er et al., 2014). For the remaining areas, any combination of Article 46 measures can
count as EFAs.
Other landscape features and types of management can still qualify as an EFA. The
task of defining them has been left to Member States’ discretion, and thus will be further
elaborated during the implementation process. Farmers also will enjoy some sort of flexibility
in deciding which features and areas to devote to EFAs. While flexibility at the farm level
may give farmers more room to adapt the new requirements to their agronomic and market
needs, it also offers the possibility for farmers to choose the easiest or least costly option of
compliance. This might not always be the best if the rationale behind EFAs is to maximize
environmental benefits.
One way to ensure that EFAs will effectively deliver the ecological benefits they are
intended to is through making sure their implementation will include: (i) environmental
targeting and tailoring; (ii) a mix of features and land types throughout different locations
within the farm; (iii) retention of EFAs for periods greater than one year; (iv) imposing limits
to agricultural operations that can be carried out in EFAs (e.g. limited fertilizer applica-
tion or no-trimming seasons); and (v) promoting the implementation of best management
practices within EFAs (Allen et al., 2012; and Pola´kova´ et al., 2011).
In general terms, the greater the proportion of uncultivated land on a farmed holding,
particularly if it is managed for environmental purposes, the greater is the positive impact
on the environment (Butler et al., 2010). However targeted interventions have been shown
to deliver greater environmental benefits within a smaller area provided they are in the right
location, are retained for a significant period of time and managed in an appropriate way
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(Hart et al, 2011).
Thus, the relative impact of an EFA in a given landscape will largely depend on farmers
and experts’ capacity to target different types of EFAs in relation to granular characteristics
of the field, and taking into account the precise objectives sought. Strategies of landscape
planning and spatial analytics can play an important role in defining what kind of EFAs
should go where. For instance, the more permanent and in-situ the traditional features that
could form EFAs are (e.g. hedgerows, stonewalls, terraces, and infield trees), the greater the
potential to meet landscape objectives, particularly within intensive arable land, as they will
help to provide structure and variation within the landscape (Allen & Hart, 2013).
The delivery of certain objectives will be influenced more by some factors than others,
so trade-offs may need to be addressed depending on the targets initially set. Economic
incentives and technical tools to support decision-making can play a key role. Also, the
design and implementation of some EFAs will require the coordination of trans-boundary
efforts, particularly to address landscape level issues, rather than relying purely on individual
farmers’ decisions. The location of an EFA within a holding and across the farmed landscape
has a direct relationship to the type, range and level of environmental benefits they have the
potential to deliver. This is why, in some cases, a combination of different locations within
the holding may be required in order to deliver the greatest level or range of benefits.
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges for scientists, practitioners, and farmers moving
forward is to develop strategies that combine the most effective measures with the most
practical approaches.
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Challenges Moving Forward
From a policy effectiveness stand point, one of the biggest questions surrounding greening
measures is how they can fit with existing CAP standards. Although there are important el-
ements that distinguish cross-compliance, greening and AESs, in practice,86 there are similar
elements related both to management practices and environmental features that are covered
jointly by each of these measures. For example, there is a clear link between EFAs and AESs
as both are considered more targeted measures. The same thing can be said about the crop
diversification rule and its link to the existing cross-compliance standard on crop rotation
(e.g. GAEC on crop rotation). Permanent grassland also areas are subject to a greater pro-
portion of the current GAEC standards, partly due to animal welfare rules. Putting these
standards under the umbrella of greening offers the advantage of making them compulsory to
farmers, thereby engaging a significant proportion of farmers in a set of simple, generalized,
annual, non-contractual measures as conditions to receive full direct payments.
From the perspective of farmers, the major concerns over greening are regarding: (i) the
eligibility of existing features as equivalent measures;87 and (ii) the possibility to adapt some
obligations in order to fit agronomic priorities, and minimize the impacts of compliance on
profitability and practicality (Allen et al., 2012).
The system of equivalent measures has raised concerns regarding double funding (Hart,
86For example, whether they are compulsory to farmers, if there is scope for Member States to implement
them in different ways, if they are annual or multi-annual contracts, if they are considered above current
reference level.
87These are farming systems and practices that have been recognized as delivering similar environmental
benefits as expected by greening. They include, for example, organic farming and farmland that has been
under some kind of agri-environment scheme. Member States can recognize at the national level what kind
of equivalent measures will automatically qualify for greening payments. In order to qualify, organic farms
need to be formally certified by an accredited body.
85
2012),88 as farmers will be paid twice for the same practice. Besides violating the double
funding principle underpinning the rules for public expenditure in the EU,89 by recognizing
equivalent measures the EU reduces the level of environmental benefits that can be achieved
through the use of the CAP budget.
5.2.3 Agri-environment Schemes (Pillar 2)
The agri-environment schemes (AESs) are the oldest and one of the most important mech-
anisms developed under the CAP Rural Development Regulation90 to sustain less profitable,
extensively-managed farms, and to mitigate the environmental impacts of agricultural inten-
sification in the EU (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2013). First developed in 1985, it has gradually
assumed greater prominence within the CAP, and since 1992 has become the only rural de-
velopment measure compulsory for Member States to implement. Key EU rural development
texts, such as the Community strategic guidelines for rural development and Regulation (EC)
No 1698/2005, recognize key environmental issues to be addressed through AESs. Among
them are: the conservation of biodiversity, the protection and sustainable management of
natural resources such as water and soil, the mitigation of climate change through the re-
duction of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the reduction of ammonia emissions and the
88Double funding as supported by the Agriculture Committee would mean that, instead of working together
to deliver increased environmental benefit, the two Pillars will both be paying for the same thing, with no
overall increased benefit to the environment.
89No costs for the same activity can be funded twice from the EU budget according to Article 111 of
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable
to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 248, 16.9.2002).
90Under the rural development regulation, Pillar 2 measures are organized according to three main themes,
known as ’thematic axes’. These are: (Axis 1) improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry
sector; (Axis 2) improving the environment and the countryside; and (Axis 3) improving the quality of life
in rural areas and encouraging diversification of the rural economy. Member States and regions are required
to spread their rural development funding between all three of these thematic axes and to identify and track
its performance in respect of common indicators of program results and impacts. AESs are only one of these
schemes funded under the Rural Development Agenda.
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sustainable use of pesticides.
AESs have been proven effective based on a number of studies (Bullock et al., 2007;
Natural England, 2009; Tucker et al., 2010), and have shown the potential to deliver the most
targeted outcomes provided they are well-designed, continuously-financed, and effectively-
implemented.
Funding to support implementation of AESs
Because AESs are co-financed by Member States and the EU,91 CAP Pillar 2 transfers are
an important source of EU funding to ensure the long-term viability of sustainable farming
in marginal, small scale and biodiversity rich farms. Despite its importance, the latest CAP
reform did not move forward on modulation. Following historical trends, Pillar 2 budget has
decreased in the last period at a greater rate than reductions in the overall budget for Pillar
1. This will likely have implications for environmental delivery within the framework of the
Rural Development Regulation (RDR).
To put this into perspective, the total Pillar 2 funding declined by 18 percent compared
to a 13 percent reduction in the Pillar 1 budget (EP, 2013). In absolute terms, the total
amount devoted to Pillar 2 also is significantly smaller than what goes to Pillar 1 schemes.
Only 25 percent of the CAP budget goes to Rural Development, and across Member States,
on average, only 4 percent of total CAP transfers is spent on AESs (EEA, 2009). Another
potential weakening of the AES budget comes from a new provision that allows Member
States to divert up to 25 percent of their rural development budget to fund direct payments
91Funding to support Member States’ Rural Development Programs (RDPs) comes partly from EU trans-
fers though the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and partly from national and
local governments, as well as the private sector.
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under Pillar 1. Also, even though part of Pillar 2 funding (30 percent under the new CAP
regulation) has been now earmarked for AESs, the money can be used to support other
schemes that involve measures not specifically targeted to environmental objectives. These
include, for example, climate change mitigation measures, organic farming, and climate-and-
environment investment measures.
Generally, public financing of AESs is mainly sustained through agri-environment pay-
ments (EU transfers plus Member States top-ups). Agri-environment payments are meant
to compensate farmers for the voluntary environmental measures implemented within their
farms which go beyond the reference level set under cross-compliance and greening mea-
sures. These commitments are signed for a period between five and seven years,92 with
payments issued annually to farmers, and calculated based on farmers’ forgone income and
costs incurred with implementation. In some Member States, AES payments also have been
conditioned on the delivery of actual outcomes, although this has not been the rule in most
Member States.
With limited budget to sustain implementation of AESs, some Member States have ex-
plored other alternative payment options.93 These have included, for example, Natura 2000
payments and payments linked to the Water Framework Directive. Attempts to integrate
AES with broader wildlife conservation and water policies, however, have remained isolated.
For instance, only 4 percent of Member States River Basin Management Programs indicated
they would use Natura 2000 and WFD payments to pay farmers for the prescriptive actions
92Following the procedures referred to in Article 90(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005. For instance,
in the UK, higher tier agri-environment schemes are contracted for a period of 10 years.
93As authorized under Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005.
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implemented through AESs.94
Other Member States have explored funding from the voluntary use of market-based
instruments. Under these systems, farmers are entitled to compensation payments in the
form of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) that are paid by beneficiaries. Among the
advantages of independent PES systems is the fact that beneficiaries are free to compensate
farmers for the public goods they provide, and are not constrained by changes on CAP com-
pensation regulations. Another potential benefit of PES is the fact that the length of these
agreements can be longer than the one established under the AES regulation, giving farmers
more incentives to participate.95 One challenge that might emerge from the implementation
of PES systems is the potential for the free-rider problem when more than one beneficiary
are involved. This, however, should not prevent PES from playing a strategic role in natural
resources management across EU Member States.
Other financial instruments are yet to be fully explored by Member States. These include,
for example, an additional funding of e3.8 billion made available through the CAP Health
Check targeting new challenges identified as crucial for European agriculture such as climate
change, renewable energy, water management, biodiversity, and dairy restructuring.96 In
94One of the reasons why Member States have not fully exploited WFD payments has to do with the
fact that implementation guidelines were not issued until February 2010 (Commission Regulation (EU) No
108/2010) - 3 years and 2 months after the rural development program period had started (EAFRD 2007-13),
and more than 1 year after the RBMPs were to be completed under Article 13 WFD.
95A PES program implemented in the Vittel catchment in the UK is an example of how long-term contracts
can be more attractive to farmers and more effective in promoting positive impacts on ecosystem services. It
was supported by an incentive package that included: (i) long-term security through 18 or 30 year contracts;
(ii) abolition of debt linked to land acquisition; (iii) subsidy of about e200 ha-1 year-1 over five-years; (iv)
up to e150,000 per farm to cover the cost of all new equipment and building modernization; (v) free labor
to apply compost in farmers’ fields; and (vi) free technical assistance including annual individual farm plans
and introduction to new social and professional networks. Furthermore, in this scheme payments (PES) are
not conditional on changes in the nitrate levels in the aquifer but are based on new farm investment and the
cost of adopting new farming practices. Both nitrate rates and farm management are regularly monitored
and recommendations for manure application are adjusted if necessary.
96Recital 3 to Decision 2009/61/EC on the assessment of the implementation of the Common Agricultural
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addition, the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) provided an extra e1 billion to be
spent on rural areas to address any of the new challenges.97 Despite these opportunities, most
Member States continue to make very little use of these extra funds, reaching an average
allocation rate of only 17.5 percent in 2012 for the EU-27 (ECA, 2014).
As the latest CAP reform did not go very far on modulation98, funding for AES con-
tinues to largely rely on Member States’ budget allocations and priorities. Here, the level
of flexibility given to Member States in implementing their AESs can function both as a
strength and weakness depending on how it is used. While some Member States have used
this flexibility to prioritize environmental delivery, others have used it to focus only on farm
modernization and competitiveness (EEA, 2009; Medina & Potter, 2015).
Besides budget constraints, the voluntary nature of AESs imposes limits to what can be
achieved through these schemes. Ultimately, the degree to which environmental priorities
and outcomes are delivered through AESs depends upon the choices and decisions made in
the design of individual projects and their implementation.
Another factor affecting policy effectiveness and cohesion is the fact that most Member
States do not usually include environmental and socioeconomic safeguards in other Pillar
2 programs. Safeguards have been set by some Member States to ensure that measures
do not lead to negative impacts on the environmental and the community. Others, on the
other hand, have left room for substantial environmental and social impacts.99 In addition,
Policy reform of 2003.
97As one of the EU responses to the 2008 economic crises, the EERP was drawn by the European Com-
mission.
98Transferring money from Pillar 1 direct payments to Pillar 2 Rural Development programs.
99In Spain, the design of rural development measures allows for the approval of projects that expand
irrigated areas, putting more pressure on high conservation value ecosystems and threatening endangers
species (OECD, 2008).
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no appropriate mechanism exists to take into account the environmental costs of programs’
spill over effects,100 unless provided under national legislation, nor have these costs been
used as a reference to calculate proportional reductions to rural development payments,
following the polluter-pays-principle. Negative spill overs also may arise from weaknesses in
the implementation of rural development measures, as in the case of ineffective inspections
carried out to approve project applications, or when basic requirements to prevent negative
impacts are not properly observed. Theoretically, Member States programs have to be
submitted to the Commission for approval, when their potential impacts are supposed to
be assessed. This screening process, however, has not been able to prevent substantial side
effects from occurring as the Commission lacks the institutional capacity and political power
to apply the necessary checks and balances.
Outcome-based payments
Currently, CAP rewarding mechanisms in AES follow an practice-based approach which
artificially caps payments based on forgone income, direct costs incurred with compliance,
and transaction costs (Franks, 2014). This means the system generally does not allow AES
payments to be calculated on the basis of the actual outcomes provided. Contrasting with
practice-based payments are outcome-based payments which aim at compensating farmers
for the provision of actual results.
In Europe, a number of studies have highlighted the potential of outcome-based ap-
proaches to improve the environmental targeting of AESs and promote long-term behavioral
changes in farming systems (Cooper et al., 2009; Schwarz et al., 2008; Burton and Burton
100For example, the costs of preventing or cleaning up the pollution caused by farming operations
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& Schwarz, 2013). In an attempt to translate scientific knowledge into policy and practice,
a number of outcome-based AEMs have been tested and implemented in Austria, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK (Schwarz & Morkve˙nas, 2012).
The German MEKA program was the first example of an outcome-based payment to be im-
plemented in a rural development program of a Member State. In this program, farmers can
select the outcome-based component for species rich grassland in addition to an practice-based
payment for extensive management of grassland.101
Despite the relatively small number and, in some cases, experimental nature of the
outcome-based payments that have been implemented in Europe so far, they are beginning
to reveal a number of key advantages in comparison to the mainstream practice-based pay-
ments. These benefits might emerge in the form of ecological, economic, and social/cultural
shifts (Burton and Schwarz, 2013). Among the key advantages found are improved environ-
mental targeting and ecological results, cost-effectiveness, greater farmer acceptance, longer
term behavioral change, and the promotion of cooperation (Harden et al., 2013; Schwarz &
Morkve˙nas, 2012).
Outcome-based schemes allow farmers to improve resource-use efficiency by applying mea-
sures that are most suitable to their operational and technological capacities and goals. Some
pilot projects testing outcome-based approaches have shown that most participating farmers
are able to reach environmental targets in a cost-effective manner, while keeping agricultural
productivity high. For instance, Musters et al. (2001) show that paying Dutch farmers per
101In 2010, nearly 50,000 ha of species rich grassland received the outcome-based support. However, the
budget share of the outcome-based support for species rich grassland on the total grassland support is with
10 percent rather small (Schwarz & Morkve˙nas, 2012).
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meadow bird clutches bred on their land is less expensive than compensating farmers for
their income losses due to restrictions on farming practices.
A study by Matzdorf & Lorenz (2010), which investigates potential advantages and dis-
advantages102 of outcome-based payments in Baden-Wuerttemberg (Germany), found that
when well designed and implemented, AESs increase cost-effectiveness. The same study
suggests also that greater flexibility provided by output-based schemes allows farmers to
respond to site-specific conditions, leading to increased acceptability when compared to pre-
scriptive measures. Discussions on these key advantages, however, remain to some extent
either theoretical or based on researchers’ first impressions, and have not yet been sustained
by comprehensive empirical evidence.
One concern that has emerged from the implementation of output-based payments is the
high level of risk and uncertainty in terms of the results to be achieved. This risk is partic-
ularly driven by farmers’ lack of control over some of the factors driving outcomes. In order
to reduce risk, some countries have adopted hybrid systems that consist of a combination
of a flat-rate practice-based payment (risk free) and a result-oriented payment.103 One of
such AES scheme targeted at water quality has been implemented in Germany, where par-
ticipating farmers situated in priority regions of the WFD have been required to: (i) keep N
surplus below 30-40 kg N/ha on a 3-year-average on all arable land of the farm (result); (ii)
participate in training courses on fertilization (action); and (iii) take measures to improve
fertilization management (action).
102The perceived advantages of output-based AES are flexibility, innovation, higher intrinsic motivation and
improved continuous adaptation, while the potential disadvantages include higher transaction costs involved
in control efforts, and increased risk for farmers.
103This is the case of the example given above on the German MEKA program.
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Using agri-environment indicators to access outcomes
Another challenge that might emerge from a broader use of outcome-based approaches
within CAP AESs schemes is the requirement for regular monitoring and continuous policy
adaptation to ensure outcomes match policy aspirations. As outcome-based schemes follow a
dynamic process, the use of agri-environment indicators has become an increasingly helpful
tool to keep track of individual and collective practices and results. These indicators can serve
a variety of policy purposes, among them: (i) providing information on the current status
and ongoing changes in the condition of the farmed environment; (ii) tracking the positive
and negative impacts of agricultural practices on the environment; (iii) assessing the impact
of agricultural and environmental policies on the environmental management of farmland;
(iv) informing agricultural and environmental policy decisions; and (v) communicating to
the broader public the relationships between agriculture and the environment (CEC, 2006).
The choice of indicators is a very important task in this process. The transparency
of outcomes, their validation and measurement are other key factors to sustain payments
and market credibility. Another challenge in implementing outcome-based approaches is in
allowing enough flexibility to farmers in the range of indicators being used, while at the same
time ensuring that indicators are specific enough to properly assess if objectives are being
achieved. Therefore, indicators must be tested for robustness to ensure that they are capable
of capturing causality between practices and results. Also, the choice of indicators must be
scientifically based, following designed trials and pilot studies to test indicators’ suitability
in relation to the outcomes targeted. At the same time, indicators must be feasible and
verifiable in terms of how they are measured. And more importantly, farmers and other
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stakeholders must participate in the process of developing indicators in order to ensure that
they are acceptable and identifiable (Burton & Schwarz, 2013).
To help inform the implementation process of AESs at the Member State level, the EU
has set the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF). Under the CMEF,
agri-environment indicators are divided into four major categories: (i) baseline indicators,
(ii) result indicators, (iii) impact indicators, and (iv) output indicators.104 Under the CMEF
framework, additional indicators can and should be developed by Member States to account
for national priorities and site-specific factors. Although Member States enjoy wide flexibility
with regard to assessment of results and impacts, additional indicators should be set in
accordance with the general principles governing the use of indicators under the CMEF
(COM, 2006).
What can be learned from biofuels certification?
While providing opportunities for rural development and serving as alternative energy
sources to fossil fuels, the production of bioenergy when not properly managed can lead to
104The baseline indicators, which are divided in objective and context related indicators, serve as base-
line conditions for assessing changes in environmental quality after the implementation of agri-environment
measures. They are divided into: (i) biodiversity indicators (measured by trends on population of farmland
birds, UAA (Utilizable Agricultural Area) of high nature value farmland and forestry, and distribution of tree
species groups); (ii) water quality indicators (measured by the status of gross nutrient balances, pollution by
nitrates and pesticides, percent territory designated as nitrate-vulnerable zones); (iii) water use indicators
(percent of irrigated utilized agricultural land, protective areas targeting soil and water quality); (iv) soil
indicators (areas at risk of soil erosion and UAA under organic farming); and (v) climate change/air quality
indicators (production of renewable energy from agriculture and forestry, UAA devoted to renewable energy
and biomass crops, and greenhouse gases and ammonia emissions from agriculture). The output indicators
are: (i) total area under agri-environment support, (ii) number of farm holdings receiving support, (iii) total
number of contracts, (iv) number of actions related to genetic resources, and (v) physical area under agri-
environment support. The result indicators then consist of assessing areas under successful land management
contributing to: (i) biodiversity and high nature value farming/forestry, (ii) water quality, (iii) mitigating
climate change, (iv) soil quality, and (v) avoidance of marginalization and land abandonment. And the im-
pact indicators indicate whether the implemented measures contributed to: (i) reversing biodiversity decline
(measured by farmland bird species population), (ii) maintenance of high nature value farmland and forestry
, (iii) improving water quality (measured by changes in gross nutrient balance), and (iv) combating climate
change (measures by increase in production of renewable energy).
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negative ecological impacts, changing land-use patterns, socio-economic impacts and GHG
emissions (Van Dam et al., 2008). These concerns have put the use and production of
bioenergy crops worldwide under particular scrutiny, with sustainable production increas-
ingly required for market access. The need to secure the sustainability of a fast growing
bioenergy market has been widely acknowledged by various stakeholders, including govern-
ments, industry, growers, and civil society organizations. Over the years, a wide range of
initiatives have undertaken steps toward the development of sustainability standards and
biomass certification systems to address the undesired impacts of a growing bio-based econ-
omy. Addressing the more complex problems arising from land-use change, however, requires
that all land-use systems follow sustainability standards and principles of good governance,
going beyond bioenergy to apply to all agricultural producers regardless of the end-use of
the product.
By tying agricultural subsidies to cross-compliance and greening standards the CAP
attempts to address some of the environmental and socioeconomic concerns of agriculture.
However, because European farmers are not required to formally verify compliance with
these standards in order to access subsidies, little has been achieved in terms of improved
conditions for public goods in agriculture. Instead, the maintenance and improvement of
good environmental and socioeconomic conditions have relied largely on the implementation
of more targeted agri-environmental schemes, which are subject to a EU-level monitoring
and evaluation system under the CMEF framework.
The development of agri-environmental indicators under the CMEF provides means to
improving the performance of rural development programs, ensuring their accountability, and
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allowing an assessment on the achievement of established objectives. The CMEF follows
similar structure used by third-party sustainability certification regimes, which typically
require producers to assess baseline (or reference) resource conditions and then take actions to
prevent degradation and ensure continuous improvement of resources. Certification schemes
have been developed for a wide range of products to address multiples aspects, including the
pursue of certain farming practices in order to maintain landscape features, restoration and
maintenance of specific habitats, and the management of natural resources such as water
and soils, for example (IEA Bioenergy, 2013; and Cooper et al., 2009). Table 5 presents a
benchmark exercise from Van Dam et al., 2010, where various biofuels certification regimes
are compared based on the environmental topics that are included in their standards.
Table 5: Environmental topics included in some biofuels sustainability standards
Source: Retrieved from Van Dam et al., 2010
Similar to the CMEF structure, certification regimes generally follow an outcome-based
approach aiming to achieve a certain standard, and operate under a number of principles,
criteria and indicators designed to check certified operators’ compliance. Within the realm
of outcome-based metrics, biofuels certification regimes generally follow either a narrative or
quantitative measurement approach.105 Both in CMEF and certification systems indicators
105Quantitative criteria are expressed in a way that specifies the precise, measurable levels of particular
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are used as tools to assess how far the expected objectives have been achieved. In the CMEF,
for example, the impact assessment is built up from the outputs and results of individual
measures through the hierarchy of objectives.106
Challenges facing implementation of CMEF indicators and outcome-based AESs
Operationalization of the CMEF framework, like in certification, has presented challenges
both in terms of quantifying and interpreting the results and impacts (ECA, 2013; and Endres
et al., 2015). In the context of the CMEF, some gaps have been identified, for example, in the
list of indicators, leading to piecemeal assessments and incomplete evaluation results. One of
the problems has been attributed to some result indicators which use vague language when
referring to, for example, measures that contribute to the ‘successful land management’ (See
infra note 92 for more detail). Another problem has been identified in the impact indicator
to assess improvements on biodiversity, which relies exclusively on farmland bird species
population, leaving aside other equally relevant species, including aquatic species. Similarly,
the impact indicator on water quality refers only to nitrates and phosphorus as pollutants,
ignoring other potentially harmful substances. At the same time, no water quantity indicator
has been established to assess water waste. Finally, the impact indicator to assess AESs’
contribution to mitigate climate change does not consider trends in GHG emissions.
There is a lack of systematic quantification of results and impacts, and clear gaps on
data completeness, reliability, and consistency to proper measure most of the CMEF agri-
environment indicators. Not only data are not always available for all Member States, but
indicator. When indicators cannot be precisely measured, narrative criteria are used to express a parameter
in a qualitative form.
106This is a tool that helps to analyze and communicate program objectives and shows how local interven-
tions should contribute to global, landscape level objectives.
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also in some cases there is no data comparability between Member States. This prevents
any consistent aggregated evaluation from being built at the EU level. Also, most programs
lack well-defined targets, which make it difficult to assess progress toward their goals.
Generally, the way the CMEF has been implemented varies considerably across Member
States, with examples of very good high quality assessment reporting, versus cases where
reporting contains gaps or contradictions (EEA, 2012).107 Gaps in monitoring emerge mostly
from inconsistent information reported by Member States to the Commission. For instance,
with regard to water quality information, in some Member States ecological and chemical
water status is unknown for more than 50 percent of water bodies, and monitoring networks
were set up late and/or have methodological weaknesses that compromise the quality of the
data collected and reported. There have been some good examples, however, of experimental
networks linking agricultural practices with environmental quality indicators.
Monitoring and verification capabilities need to be improved across the whole EU. Mem-
ber States should be required to provide data on all agri-environment indicators in a more
timely, reliable and consistent manner. Also, to secure CAP objectives are actually achieved,
the Commission must ensure that, at the very least, it has information that is capable of
measuring the evolution of the pressures placed by agricultural practices on the environment
and keeping track of the improvements achieved through AESs. Lessons could be drawn from
the development and implementation of output-metric standards and certification schemes
for biofuels, which can greatly inform progress in developing the methodological and institu-
tional structures for operationalizing agri-environment indicators in agriculture in general.
107EEA Report No 8/2012 European waters: assessment of status and pressures.
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Private certification should not serve as substitute for public governance, however, as
questions remain whether certification alone is capable of developing and applying compre-
hensive methodologies to measure the less tangible benefits of agriculture (e.g. food security,
cultural heritage, and improved environmental conditions). Quantifying these benefits and
landscape level impacts of certain land-use systems and practices has been one of the most
challenging tasks for existing certification schemes and individual operators (particularly
small farmers). This requires additional and long-term research on identifying the causal
connection between sustainability practices and potential positive outcomes, which is both
costly and time-consuming (Endres et al., 2015; and Dale et al., 2013). Experiences and
lessons learned in the biofuels sector have the potential to shift the sustainability debate
into all production landscapes and systems.
On the operationalization side, key lessons from biofuels certification suggest that field-
testing assessments can be prohibitively expensive. Farm-level verification of selected oper-
ators represents the most expensive part of the monitoring system.108 These on-spot checks
are usually associated with high administration and monitoring costs that small farmers
cannot usually afford. This partially explains why small-scale extensive farmers make up
the minority of participating operators in outcome-based schemes (Schwarz & Morkve´nas,
2012). Improving their access to these mechanisms should, therefore, be a policy priority for
the EU and national governments.
While implementation of AESs and cross-compliance measures have partially succeeded
108During the auditing process information gathered by randomly selected farmers is verified, and site visits
are carried out to monitor certain management practices and verify, for example, the level of inputs applied,
existing water discharge systems, soil conservation strategies, and etc.
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in maintaining, and in some cases enhancing, environmental value in some areas of public
good provision (Boatman et al., 2008), there is a need for more targeted and cost-effective
measures, and also to learn from some of the more innovative, smaller-scale programs cur-
rently being implemented at the national, regional, and local levels (Cooper et al., 2009). If
the argument behind subsidies following a market regulation approach to multifunctionality
is to truly compensate farmers for the provision of public goods and services, actual outputs
need to be measured, valued and monitored so that they can be paid for accurately.
Perhaps the greatest challenge CAP enforcement agencies will have to face moving for-
ward is to address difficulties in measuring the less tangible aspects of multifunctionality
(e.g. food security, rural development and other social benefits arising from agriculture), let
alone the challenges in harmonizing quantitative models developed to measure other more
tangible indicators of multifunctionality (e.g. carbon emissions, water quality and quantity,
biodiversity loss, etc.). Because many of the environmental and socioeconomic externalities
in question are diffuse in nature, or expensive to quantify and audit, and do not usually
lend themselves to more standardized accounting frameworks, addressing these challenges
will require the development of scientifically-verifiable, objective measurements.
Developing this institutional and analytical capability will allow Member States to audit
and verify at the farm-level what is being paid for, as well as to check if outputs match
landscape level aspirations (sustainability and multifunctionality goals). The emphasis on
landscape level analysis and perspectives is important because it allows for measurement,
monitoring and assessment of the relative sustainability associated with different components
of heterogeneous agricultural systems, and for identifying the interactions among these com-
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ponents and broader landscapes across scales and over time. In other words, a landscape-level
approach is able to link agricultural management practices with past, current, and desired
environmental and socioeconomic conditions (Dale et al., 2013). To effectively implement
this analytical capacity, results must be monitored over time, and trends in important indica-
tors must be analyzed. This can create opportunities for third-party certification within the
scope of the CAP, although certification itself is yet to develop the appropriate institutional
and analytical capacity for assessing prevailing conditions, monitoring trends, providing a
warning signal of impending changes, and diagnosing causes of change.
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF CAP STANDARDS AT
THEMEMBER STATE LEVEL: A UK CASE STUDY
In addition to understanding the legal framework of CAP environmental standards, it is
important to explore how these schemes and requirements are implemented at the Member
State level so they actually can translate into environmental improvements at the farm and
landscape level. As I have pointed in several parts of this work, many decisions are left
to Member States, and several aspects of the CAP regulation can be tailored depending
on national or regional priorities. This has led to various levels of policy outcomes across
different Member States. In this subsection, I examine the UK as a case-study to explore
how implementation of CAP environmental standards has occurred and the main challenges
to achieving actual sustainability gains.
Similar to the EU as a whole, the farming sector in the UK is highly heterogeneous.
Over the past 20 years, the UK has seen an increasing portion of its food being supplied
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by imports. Domestic supply dropped from 75 percent in the 1990s to nearly 60 percent
today (Defra, 2015a). In order to reverse this trend and sustain the UK food and farming
sector, considerable investments have been made to modernize and increase productivity and
competitiveness of British farmers. Today, some 12 percent of the workforce is employed
in agriculture, 70 percent of the landscape is shaped by farming, and 27 percent of the
agricultural land is considered of high nature value (HNV) land (EEA, 2009). Among the
biggest issues faced by agriculture in the UK is pest control (both animal and plant diseases).
Maintaining and improving soil health also has been a big challenge for the UK, which faces
an 80 percent soil loss rate, especially driven by market pressure to increase productivity
and low investments in soil conservation strategies.
In the UK, much like in the whole EU, farmers are heavily reliant on CAP subsidies.
Figures reveal that, on average, livestock farmers in less favored areas (LFA) receive around
79 percent of their annual income from CAP subsidies. Cereal farmers have 37 percent of
their annual income dependent on CAP transfers, and dairy farmers rely on CAP payments
to receive 33 percent of their annual income (Defra, 2012). Although both small and large
farmers agree on the importance of the CAP for maintaining the farming sector, they disagree
on how the money should be spent.
While large farmers have put significant political effort in lobbying for the maintenance
of CAP income support provided through direct payments, smaller farmers and environmen-
tal advocates, on the other hand, advocate for continuing modulation and more targeted
environmental delivery. The main lobby groups influencing CAP negotiations in the UK
are farmers (mostly represented by the National Farmers Union - NFU) and environmental
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organizations (represented by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, RSPB).109
Defra (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) is the government agency
in charge of implementing the CAP in the UK, with the support of Natural England, the
Forestry Commissioner, and the Rural Payment Agency. The Farming Advice Service offers
to British farmers advice on greening and cross-compliance.
Among the priorities set by the UK in the implementation of the latest CAP reform is
the goal to meet the EU obligations while at the same time ensuring maximum flexibility
for farmers to manage their business flexibly. Defra has been one of the major critics of
the three crops requirement established under the crop diversification greening measure. It
argues that farmers should be free to produce what consumers (the market) want to buy, not
what has been dictated by the EU (Defra, 2015). It also has expressed its commitment to
make greening more attractive to farmers, minimizing red tape and bureaucracy, and keeping
practices as simple as possible. In other words, preserving what is positive and redirecting
what interfere with farmers’ capacity to respond to market demands (Defra, 2014).
In a related matter, Defra also has made it clear that it wants the EU to reconsider its
regulations on pesticides and GMO permits to reflect what it believes has been validated as
safe by science. Demands for more local-level decision making to give national authorities
more power to consolidate or simplify existing rules in order to accommodate local challenges
and priorities also have been one of Defra’s claims.
109The RSPB is a member of BirdLife International.
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The Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) in the UK
As previously mentioned, with the latest reform, all direct payments are administered by
Member States through the new Basic Payment Scheme (BPS). In the UK, farmers with
at least 5 hectares of eligible land qualify for BPS. These farmers will have to be tested
under the new Active Farmer Test.110 As the UK did not identify any land that could be
classified as ‘naturally kept in a state suitable for cultivation and grazing’, only the first
part of the active farmer test, related to business activities, will apply. Common land (e.g.
crofting common grazing in Scotland)111 also will be eligible for payments under the BPS,
which opens opportunities for cooperation among farmers toward compliance with CAP
environmental schemes.
Cross-compliance, in the UK, is the minimum requirement farmers must comply with
in order to receive payments under the: (i) Basic Payment Scheme; (ii) Countryside Stew-
ardship (AES); (iii) Entry Level Stewardship (ELS - AES); (iv) Higher Level Stewardship
(HLS - AES); and, (v) Woodland Management Grant and Farm Woodland Premium. Like
in any other Member State, cross-compliance is made up of Statutory Management Require-
ments (SMR) and Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAEC). Exemptions
or derogations to cross-compliance may apply depending on the type and the size of a
holding. Tables 6 and 7 offer a brief summary of all UK GAEC and SMR environmental
standards and the practices that farmers are required to implement. In the UK, the Cross
110See supra note 63 for more information on the Active Farmer Test.
111While the land involved is mostly owned by private land owners, the local crofting communities have
secure legal rights of occupation and use. Due this unique tenure system under which crofters hold their
land, crofting areas are home to some of the highest densities of rural population anywhere in the UK. This
has, to some extent, ensured that crofting common grazings still cover a substantial part of the Highlands
and Islands - 541,750 hectares or around 7 percent of Scotland’s total land area (Wightman et al., 2003).
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Compliance Advice Programme, part of the Farm Advisory System, advises farmers about
cross compliance.
Claimants are entirely responsible for compliance, even if the land is transferred to some-
one else in the same year a BPS application has been filled. Payments can be subject to
reduction in the event of non-compliance of GAEC and SMR standards. For negligent cases,
payments will normally be reduced by 3 percent (for each non-compliance). However, re-
ductions can range from 1 to 5 percent depending on the extent, severity, reoccurrence and
permanence of the non-compliance. Recurrent non-compliance is subject to higher penalties.
For instance, if a penalty is applied for the second time, the payment reduction will be three
times the size of the first penalty (even if that dates back to old SPS or rural development
schemes). However, penalties cannot exceed 15 percent. After this, any more instances of
non-compliance will be treated as intentional.
Intentional cases are normally subject to a 20 percent reduction, which can be reduced
to 15 percent or increased up to 100 percent depending on the extent, severity, reoccurrence
and permanence of the non-compliance. Ultimately, a claimant may be forbidden to apply
for BPS if he/she continues to break the rules, the same applying to those who prevent
government inspectors from verifying compliance.
In terms of the new greening rules, there will not be major changes in the UK. The amount
of eligible agricultural land will determine what farmers need to do to meet the greening rules.
Eligible agricultural land is made up of all the: (i) arable land,112 (ii) permanent grassland
112Arable land consists of: (i) land cultivated for crop production, (ii) fallow land, and (iii) temporary
grassland.Fallow land is land that has no crop production or grazing, meaning it cannot gave permanent
crops or permanent grasslands on it. Temporary grassland (including herbaceous forage) is land that has
been in grass or other herbaceous forage for less than 5 years. This includes land that has been used for
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Table 6: GAEC standards in the UK
GAEC Measures
GAEC 1: Establishment
of buffer strip along water-
courses
Farmers must protect watercourses against pollution and
run-off from agricultural sources by maintaining buffer strip
GAEC 2: Water abstrac-
tion
Farmers must have a permit from the Environment Agency
(EA) to take more than 20 cubic meters (4,400 gallons) of
water, from an inland or underground source for irrigation,
in a single day
GAEC 3: Groundwater Farmers must have a permit from the Environment Agency
(EA) before they release (discharge) any substance that
may harm or pollute groundwater, unless that discharge is
an activity that is exempt
GAEC 4: Minimum soil
cover
Farmers must take all reasonable steps to protect soil by
having a minimum soil cover unless there is an agronomic
justification for not doing so, or where establishing a cover
would conflict with requirements under GAEC 5
GAEC 5: Minimum land
management reflecting site
specific conditions to limit
erosion
Farmers must put measures in place to limit soil and bank-
side erosion caused, for example, by: cropping practices and
cropping structures, livestock management, including out-
door pigs and poultry, causing overgrazing and poaching,
wind, vehicles, trailers and machinery
GAEC 6: Maintenance of
soil organic matter
Farmers must not burn crop stubble except for plant health
reasons, and shall not plough, cultivate or intensify species-
rich and semi-natural habitats so as to keep organic matter
and carbon levels in soils
GAEC 7a: Boundaries Farmers must protect boundary features, such as
hedgerows, stone walls, earth banks and stone banks be-
cause they are important landscape features (cutting, trim-
ming and removal restrictions also apply, as well as restric-
tions to not cultivate or apply fertilizers in these areas)
GAEC 7c: Trees Farmers may need to get a permit from the Forestry Com-
mission if they want to cut down a tree. They must check
if a tree has a Tree Preservation Order (TPO) and meet
any conditions of the TPO. They also must follow the rules
about when you can trim or cut trees.
GAEC 7d: Sites of Special
Scientific Interest (SSSIs)
Farmers must not damage or destroy SSSIs, land which has
been identified to have special flora, fauna, or geological or
physiographical features
Source: Defra, 2015b.
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Table 7: SMR standards in the UK
SMR Measures
SMR 1: Reduce water pol-
lution in NVZs
Farmers with land in nitrogen vulnerable zones must help to
reduce pollution by using and storing fertilizer and manure
carefully
SMR 2: Wild birds Farmers must protect all wild birds, their eggs and nests.
Extra rules apply if they have land classified as a Special
Protection Area (SPA)a
SMR 3: Habitats and
Species
Farmers must protect species of flora and fauna. Extra
rules apply if they have land designated as a Special Area
of Conservation (SAC)
SMR 10: Plant Protection
Products
Farmers must follow strict controls over the use of pesti-
cides as they can harm people, wildlife and the environ-
ment. Also they can only use plant protection products
with a valid UK authorization or parallel trade permit, and
follow UK guidelines for application of these products
Source: Defra, 2015b. aSpecial Protection Areas (SPA) are designated as a Sites of Special
Scientific Interest (SSSI).
and (iii) permanent crops113 in a farm.
Although permanent crops are not considered as arable land, they are still eligible for
payments. The difference between them is that contrary to arable land, permanent crops do
not need to follow greening measures. In fact, some of these permanent crops can qualify as
EFAs (short rotation coppice). Some energy grasses, such as Miscanthus, also are recognized
as permanent crops, which can be used to source bioenergy and provide ecosystem services.
This creates opportunities to explore the ecological and energy value of these species in
various ways and promote more integration of bioenergy systems into agriculture.
For instance, if efficiently cultivated, herbaceous grasses (temporary grassland) can pro-
livestock production, as long as it has not been sown with another crop.
113Permanent crops are crops that occupy the land for 5 years or more (other than permanent grassland)
and provide repeated harvests. These include short-rotation coppice, nursery crops and multi-annual crops.
Short rotation coppice means areas planted with tree species that consist of woody, perennial crops, the
rootstock or stools remaining in the ground after harvesting, with new shoots emerging in the following
season. Examples of short rotation coppices include: poplar (Populus spp) and willow (Salix spp).
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vide forage for ruminants, while also serving as sources of lignocellulosic feedstocks for the
production of bioenergy. Herbaceous grasses also can serve as vegetation filters that intercept
and capture nitrate running from fertilized cropland and animal manure, thereby reducing
nitrate leaching into waterways (Skenhall et al, 2013). Certain permanent crops (short rota-
tion coppice and Miscanthus) if cultivated in alleys and buffer strip in agricultural landscapes
also can reduce erosion and nutrient loss, and sustain yields. Therefore, proper integration
of such plant species into agricultural landscapes may reduce nitrate-related environmental
problems and contribute to a more diversified landscape. Willow, for example, can tolerate
relatively high concentrations of nitrate and be cultivated in plantations used for capturing
nutrient runoff from intensively cultivated cropland and wastewater treatment plants (Aron-
sson, 2000; and Heaton et al., 2004). It also is an energy-intense bioenergy feedstocks that
can be used for the production of bioenergy and a wide range of other renewable products.
In terms of implementation of EFA in the UK, landscape features and land-uses will be
subject to weighting factors (Defra, 2014). While hedges and buffer strip are worth more than
their actual measurements, catch/cover crops and nitrogen-fixing crops are worth less. This
is because when setting the weighting factors to determine the eligibility of these features to
qualify as EFA, the UK has set different weighting coefficients. For instance, 1 meter of length
of hedges is equivalent to 10 square-meters of EFA, while 1 meter of length of buffer strip
is worth 9 square-meters of EFA. On the other hand, 1 square-meter of catch crops/cover
crops or nitrogen-fixing crops are worth 0.3 square-meters and 0.7 square-meter of EFA,
respectively. Because some weighting factors were set as greater than 1, it will be possible
for farmers in the UK to comply with the EFA rule even if they have less than 5 percent
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of their eligible land under EFA. This criterion significantly weakens the implementation of
EFA in the UK, and is likely to undermine its capacity to deliver environmental benefits.
In order to verify if farmers are properly following cross-compliance and greening mea-
sures, government inspectors visit a certain percentage of holdings each year. The verification
system works in a way that in each scheme year, 1 percent of claimants of Basic Payment
Scheme (BPS) are inspected. These visits can happen more than once a year, and they may
not always be preceded by an advanced warning. If farmers are notified in advance, this
may occur only less than 48 hours before the inspection (Defra, 2015b). Farmers who do not
cooperate with inspectors can lose their payments.
Agri-environment schemes in the UK
When it comes to rural development policies, the UK has a long-term experience with im-
plementation of agri-environment schemes (AES). Administered by Natural England, AESs
have existed since 1987 and traditionally have paid particular attention to biodiversity conser-
vation, specially targeted at birds protection. However, since 2005 the current Environmental
Stewardship Program (ESP) has served a range of objectives which include the enhancement
of habitats, mitigation of climate change, and promoting visits to the countryside (Natural
England, 2009).
The ESP is a country wide AES in the UK which includes from more attainable to more
complex measures, normally combining an Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) element with a
Higher Level Stewardship (HLS) scheme. The scheme is mainly an practice-based AES where
farmers have to fulfill a set of defined prescriptions. It includes also a range of ‘indicators
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of success’ (as a basis for bonus payments) associated with each habitat type of relevance to
the scheme’s objectives and joint character areas which guide the identification of priority
locations for specific targets. Payments are made at a standard cost based flat-rate and
for the purchase of capital items (Natural England, 2009). Similar to the BPS verification
system, 1 percent of claimants of rural development funding are inspected every year, and
also are subject to payment reductions in case of non-compliance.
Despite its long-term experience in implementing AES schemes, the UK’s average Pillar
2 payment rate per hectare is the lowest in Europe (Council of the European Union, 2011).
Also, high nature value farms receive significantly less total support per hectare (EEA, 2009).
Also differences exist in terms of how Pillar 2 funding is allocated across countries. For
example, in England 80 percent of the rural development budget is allocated to AES (EEB,
2012). In Scotland, on the other hand, there has been more priority placed on supporting the
Less Favorable Areas Support Scheme (LFASS) as an additional income support for farmers.
AESs still receive 50 percent of Pillar 2 budget in Scotland (RSPB, 2011).
The large majority of UK farmers have maintained CAP support without having to
go beyond cross compliance, whether because they do not access AESs or only access the
(entry) low level of such schemes. Recent analysis has suggested that the widespread use of
low-intensity AES in the UK has failed to raise the environmental baseline set under cross-
compliance, and delivered moderate biodiversity gains (Whittingham, 2011; and Baulcombe
et al., 2009). A recent survey by BirdLife International concluded that although UK’s AESs
have considerable potential to support farmland biodiversity, they have been undermined by
an insufficient allocation of resources and some poorly designed schemes (Boccaccio et al.
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2009).
Others, however, suggest some AESs have been successful in delivering benefits to biodi-
versity, particularly for farmland plants and birds, species-rich grasslands, hedgerows, moor-
land and lowland heath, and some type of wetland (Boatman et al., 2008). There has been
success, for example, with schemes targeted at specific species. In the UK, implementation
a special agri-environment project was able to increase the national breeding population of
cirl buntings from 118 pairs in 1989 to 862 in 2009, preventing the species from being lost
from the UK altogether. This has been achieved through a partnership between government
agencies, non-governmental organizations and farmers, and has been seen as a successful
case of targeted implementation of AES. More importantly, participants were able to accom-
modate the measures within their existing farm practices to deliver effective conservation
results (Evans et al. 2002). Along with practicality, other factors leading to effective imple-
mentation were attractive financial incentives, and the availability of advisers with specific
conservation knowledge. The projects benefited also from their ability to target resources to
relatively small areas. There is potential to apply similar methodologies to other farmland
bird species, as many other populations such as the skylark, corn bunting, grey partridge
and turtle dove continue to be threatened.
Despite relative success in biodiversity conservation, UK AESs have shown little contri-
bution to protect water and soil, although these have only recently become explicit objectives
of AES projects. This gap calls for greater targeting and tailoring of these schemes to other
environmental problems in agriculture (Baulcombe et al., 2009). In order to prioritize land
for delivering multiple functions, the implementation of AES may be supported by landscape
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planning strategies to target land use to, in selected places, deliver public goods.
Because most entry-level schemes are likely to be diverted to meet the new greening
measures, UK AESs are expected to become much more focused on Higher Level Stewardship
agreements (HLS), which have the potential to deliver improved environmental outcomes.
In a period of scarce rural development funding, refocusing AES budget to more targeted
schemes may offer a opportunities for the development of more environmentally effective and
cost-efficient schemes.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATION
In today’s policy context, agriculture is expected to produce abundant and affordable food,
while at the same time taking into account the environment, maintaining rural landscapes,
and protecting the welfare of animals and the health of consumers. In Europe, the Common
Agricultural Policy has been reformed to address these issues, with promises to promote a
fairer distribution of agricultural funds among farmers, and most importantly to make the
CAP more environmentally friendly.
Although some environmental issues arising from agriculture are addressed in EU reg-
ulation, tying CAP subsidies to environmental and rural development objectives offers the
most promising opportunity to accelerate a transition toward more sustainable and resource-
efficient farming systems. Driven by the multifunctionality paradigm, past CAP reforms have
seen the environment and rural development become permanent issues of debate, pushing
for further integration of environmental and socioeconomic standards into CAP supporting
schemes.
Currently, environmental objectives are delivered through the implementation of three
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major instruments: cross-compliance, greening measures, and Agri-environment Schemes
(AES). While cross-compliance and greening measures have the advantage of being applied
to all farmers accessing subsidies across the whole EU, AESs continue to be implemented
on a voluntary basis, with wide variation on how Member States design and adjust these
schemes to address local priorities and conditions.
Despite several attempts to shift CAP subsidies from the initial trade-distorting price
support schemes to be provided in the form of decoupled direct payments, past reforms have
not resulted in overall reduction of EU expenditure on agricultural policy. In the contrary,
the CAP continues to receive the largest share (40 percent) of the EU budget, and to follow
similar patterns of distribution within pillars. As always, European farmers remain heavily
dependent on CAP support systems as a source of income, with direct payments maintain-
ing the lion’s share of the CAP budget. Consequently, farmers have made a tremendous
effort to maintain the CAP supporting systems in place and to ensure a large portion of
its budget continues to fund direct payments with minimum environmental standards at-
tached. Environmental organizations, on the other hand, have worked intensively to ensure
that subsidies are shifted from payment entitlements toward sustaining more targeted agri-
environment payments for public goods, which should be implemented in a transparent and
accountable way.
My research findings point to an apparent failure of the EU in pursuing further greening
of the CAP. I find that environmental and socioeconomic objectives only have been par-
tially integrated into the CAP supporting schemes, either because of the limited scope of
the objectives or the unsuccessful implementation of standards. Several standards remain
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to be added to the list of CAP environmental and socioeconomic standards. In addition,
implementation of cross-compliance, greening measures, and agri-environment schemes have
been tailored in various ways to adapt to Member States’ priorities and conditions, often in
detriment of EU sustainability goals. The large majority of the CAP budget continues to
favor direct payments with minimum environmental and socioeconomic requirements. At the
same time, entry-level, poorly designed and under-financed AESs fail to deliver the expected
environmental outcomes beyond those set under cross-compliance. This serves as evidence
that CAP payments have only been partially explored as a way to promote environmental
and rural development objectives, and to foster agricultural multifunctionality.
If subsidies are supposed to truly compensate the non-commodity outputs of agriculture,
CAP supporting schemes will have to shift toward broader implementation of outcome-based
payments. There is opportunity to learn from pilot outcome-based programs implemented
in some Member States (e.g. Germany), which can and should influence the adoption of
similar systems in other Member States. Also, experiences and lessons learned in the design
and implementation of outcome-based standards in the biofuels sector can inform initiatives
emerging from other agricultural sectors in the EU. A successful operationalization of such
outcome-based payments, however, requires efforts to develop the appropriate institutional
and analytical capacity to measure, monitor, and evaluate results, as well as to check if
outcomes match targeted sustainability aspirations. Investments in long-term research to
develop and test quantitative measurement tools also will be key to allow the establishment
of causal links between outcomes and particular practices across space and over time.
Improving monitoring and enforcement capabilities must be a priority to the EU and all
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Member States. This requires further developing and applying operational agri-environment
indicators to assess trends, improving data collection and availability to support measure-
ments, and further developing mapping capabilities to facilitate monitoring. Besides facil-
itating the verification of compliance, these instruments can inform adaptive management,
and help Member States and the EU to set priorities for the design of future policies to
ensure continuous improvement. Lastly, strengthening the national Farm Advisory Systems
(FAS) is crucial to ensure that farmers are receiving the appropriate assistance and training
to understand and implement standards. Moreover, farmer’s participation in the design and
implementation of measures and indicators should be encouraged in order to ensure that
they are acceptable and identifiable to farmers.
Up to this date, EU and Member States’ policy efforts to address complex ecosystem
challenges emerging from the unsustainable use of natural resources have remained to a con-
siderable degree fragmented. This reality has made it even more challenging for Europe to
revert current levels of environmental degradation across farm fences and Member States’
boundaries. There is a need for a fundamental re-think on the way agricultural policies are
designed and implemented to address sustainability issues as wide as climate change, water
pollution, biodiversity, and soils. To fully understand and deliver the potentials of multi-
functionality, fragmented policies and funding mechanisms will have to be better integrated.
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